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THE SCOPE OF THE TREATY POWER
IN THE UNITED STATES*
By C. H. McLAUGBLINt

From the standpoint of international law every independent
state is considered to possess full power to conclude treaties upon
nearly all subjects of mutual interest.1 But it does not follow that
the central government of such a state must possess a treaty-making
power coextensive with that of the state. By constitutional limitations in the nature of a self-denying ordinance the state may elect
to confine its government to a prescribed method of concluding
international agreements, or to restrict the range of subjects with
respect to which the government is authorized to conclude agreements. That such constitutional limitations do not impair the treaty
power of the state itself but only that of its central government is
evident from the state's retention of power to change the limitations
by amendment of the constitution. 2
The rights and obligations, or relationship, created under intrenational law by international agreements may equally be invoked
*Sections III and IV of this paper, dealing with recent practice in the
use of treaties and executive agreements and with proposals for constitutional
amendment, respectively, together with an appendix by Gary J. Meyer tabulating executive agreements with reference to Congressional authorization or
approval, will appear in an early issue.
,Professor, Department of Political Science; Director, Center for International Relations and Area Studies, University of Minnesota.
1. Not all but nearly all subjects because some treaties, like contracts
within domestic law systems, must be considered illegal and therefore void
ab initio. Such illegality would consist in provisions violative of general
international law, whether established by custom or convention. In the case of
particular obligations assumed by a state under a treaty there would clearly
be a duty to other signatories not to enter into later treaties incompatible with
the discharge of those obligations, but if later inconsistent treaties were
nevertheless concluded it might be academic to insist that they must be treated
as void ab initio. In the absence of mechanisms, other than the use of force,
for compelling states to render specific performance under the terms of a
treaty it would seem that the offending state will choose which of the two or
more inconsistent treaty obligations it will honor, after which the state or
states injured by the breach of obligations to them will be left to seek appropriate compensation for damages suffered. It is unnecessary for present purposes to pursue these points. For comment with illustrations see 2 Hyde, International Law Cheifly as Interpreted by the United States, §§ 409-92 (2d ed.
1945) (hereinafter cited as Hyde); 1 Oppenheim, International Law, §§
503-06 (8th ed., Lauterpacht 1955); Roxburgh, International Conventions
and Third States (1917) ; Verdross, Forbidden Treaties its International
Law, 31 Am. J. Int'l L. 571-77 (1937).
2. See Potter, Inhibitions upon the Treaty-Making Power of the United
States, 28 Am. J. Int'l L. 456, 470 (1934), who says:
There is no doubt that a state may decline to conclude a treaty, within the
permissive field, on grounds of policy, or on mere grounds of caprice for
that matter. So for the government of the state, or the treaty-making
organ, speaking on behalf of the state. But it would not seem that the
state could, by statute or constitutional provision, destroy, deny that it
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whether the agreement be designated as treaty, convention, protocol,
procts-verbal, agreement, arrangement, accord, act, general act,
declaration, modus vivendi, statute, regulations, provisions, pact,
covenant, charter, or merely exchange of notes. 3 Of course these
terms do suggest differences in form or content or occasion which
are rather loosely observed in diplomatic practice, but the differences
do not affect international legal status. For that it is not the form
or nomenclature employed but simply the fact of agreement through
agencies authorized to act for the states which is significant.4 Even
oral agreement by authorized persons on behalf of their states when
sufficiently established by evidence may be binding.' International
usage appears to sanction the use of the term "treaty" in a kind of
generic sense to comprehend all formal instruments of agreement
between or among states, by whatever title designated, which create
among them a relationship governed by international law. In this
or its government possessed, or forbid the general exercise of, the treatymaking power conferred by international law. A state, a subject of international law, its powers fixed thereby, may not by national law reduce the
scope of its own treaty-making power, which is necessarily defined by
international law, so as to be able afterwards to deny that it possesses,
under that law which must be regarded as finally decisive in this matter,
the power to make such and such a treaty. A state may refuse to sign
a given proposed treaty on grounds of policy, but cannot effectively bind
itself, even by declaring that it will not, on grounds of policy, sign such
and such treaties in the future, for this would in effect reduce the scope
of its internationally given treaty power. The source of that power being
the international community and the medium of its grant international
law, it cannot be definitively limited in its extent or its exercise by action
or law emanating from a lower source, namely, the national community.
If taken literally Professor Potter is demolishing a straw man, for no
one would suggest that an independent state could impose constitutional limitations upon itself as a state which it could not avoid by later action, unless
it did so by giving up its independence to another state or union of states,
which would then assume the treaty power, or by acquiescing in the creation
of a restrictive rule of international law. But if he means that a state could
not place such limitations upon its government his view hardly accords with
the practice of states.
3. See Myers, Names and Scope of Treaties, 51 Am. J. Int'l L. 172,
217 (1957) ; Research in InternationalLaw under the Auspices of the Faculty
of the Harvard Law School, 29 Am. J. Infl L. Supplement, 710-22 (1935)
(hereinafter cited as Harvard Research) (where the significance of these
designations is considered at length); see also Hudson, International Law,
ed. note at 443 (3d ed. 1951) : Treaties and Other International Acts of the
United States of America 9-14 (Miller ed. 1931) (short print).
4. Jones, Full Powers and Ratification (1949) ; 1 Oppenheim, International Law §§ 497-98 (8th ed., Lauterpacht 1955) ; Harvard Research 668-69;
McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Congressiotal-Executive or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 Yale L.J.
181, 534, esp. § II (1945).
5. Harvard Research 728-32; see the case between Norway and Denmark
concerning the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 53,
at 73 (1933), in which the Permanent Court of International Justice gave
effect to an oral declaration by Norwegian Foreign Minister Ihlen to the
Danish Minister made in response to a Danish inquiry. Minutes of the conversation by both parties were in evidence.
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sense formal executive agreements although not referred to any legislative body would be included." Of course it is obvious that what are
called "treaties" in the special domestic sense of the constitutional
law of the United States, where they are distinguished from "executive agreements," rhust be referred for consent to ratification to the
U.S. Senate, for the Constitution requires this; but these "treaties"
may be concluded with other states in which there is no constitutional requirement of reference to the legislative branch, so that
signature and ratification are there effected as purely executive acts. 7
Although treaties in the international sense are defined as formal
instruments no particular form is required for international validity
beyond the execution of the instruments through signature and ratification by agents authorized to act for the states which conclude
them. And informal instruments such as notes, telegrams, or conversations, although not regarded as treaties because not so executed, may equally produce enforceable international rights and
obligations. Ratification and exchange of ratifications/ may usually
be assumed to be prerequisite to bringifig formal instruments into
force but may be dispensed with by special agreement or customary
practice.$ In any case the constitutional procedures involved in
securing ratification in a particular state are a domestic matter not
regulated by international law.
The purpose of this paper is to consider legal limitation and
definition of the power of the Government of the United States to
conclude international agreements, particularly as affected by recent
interpretations. Such an inquiry involves constitutional law within
the context of international law. The latter provides a general framework which controls the external conduct of the United States in
making treaties and which defines international rights and obligations created by them. Within that framework lies a large area of
permissive national regulation concerned with domestic procedures
of treaty making and with the status of international agreements
within the domestic law of the United States.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PRovIsIoNS

A. GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
In the United States the national Constitution imposes a familiar
division of the total array of powers belonging to the federal state.
6. Harvard Research 686-98; McDougal and Lans, supra note 4, at
196-97. It is in this sense that the title of this paper is intended, as comprehending formal international agreements generally.
7. For some variations in state practice which produced misunderstandings, see Jones, op. cit. supra note 4, at 118-19.
8. Harvard Research 756-69; Jones, op. cit. supra note 4, at 66, 74.
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Certain powers enumerated in the Constitution are delegated by it
to the national government. These include a number of powers
affecting the conduct of foreign affairs which are assigned to the
Congress as a whole? or to one of its houses,1" to the President,"
9. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. Those most significant for foreign affairs are

taxation for the common defense and general welfare; the power to borrow
money; regulation of foreign commerce; rules of naturalization; regulations
of foreign exchange; provision of postal facilities; copyright and patent protection; definition and punishment of piracy, felonies committed on the
high seas, and offenses against international law; declaration of war (although
there is no prohibition of military actions ordered by the President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces without a declaration of war, and there
have been more than 125 such cases of military actions or maintenance of
military positions abroad). See Powers of the President to Send the Armed
Forces Outside the United. States, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations and Armed Services, Feb. 28, 1951, p. 2; Background Information on the Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries,
H. Rep. No. 127, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) ; issuance of letters of marque and
reprisal (a practice now obsolete) ; prize regulations; provision, maintenance,
and regulation of military forces (which, however, when in being, are at the
disposition of the President) ; and legislation "which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers" and any others
delegated to the national government or its departments or officers.
10. The House of Representatives has the "sole power of impeachment"
of officials (U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl.5), but the trial of impeachments is
conducted by the Senate (U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6). No cases based upon
ultra vires acts related to the conduct of foreign affairs have arisen, although
from time to time there have been rumblings by individual Congressmen that
the President ought to be impeached, e.g., against Harry Truman for ordering
U.S. forces into the Korean war without a declaration of war by the Congress, although he considered his action to be based on a treaty obligation
under the Charter of the United Nations. Revenue bills must originate in the
House of Representatives (U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl.1), but may be freely
amended in the Senate, even to striking everything after the enacting clause
and substituting a new bill. The debates on appropriations for foreign affairs
programs frequently afford opportunities both in appropriations committees
and on the floor of House and Senate to reexamine the policies for which
financial support is sought, and refusal to grant it could make it impossible
for the United States to *discharge treaty commitments. The Senate possesses
the important exclusive powers to advise and consent to the making of treaties
by the President and to the appointment by him of ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other
officers of the United States whose posts are established by law and for whose
2). The
appointment no other provision is made (U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.
latter part of the clause does not prevent the use by the President of personal
agents designated solely by him. Consult Wriston, Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations (1929). The employment for international negotiations
of Colonel House by Wilson and of Harry Hopkins by F. D. Roosevelt are
familiar examples. Because of the constitutional provision Foreign Service
Officers are appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate,
but no career officers are now nominated until they have qualified by competitive examination nor promoted except upon recommendation by disinterested promotion boards after review of their service records. However,
some ambassadors and ministers are still appointed as non-career officers.
11. In addition to a broad grant of "the executive power" (U.S. Const.
art. II, § 1, cl. 1), and responsibility for faithful execution of the laws (U.S.
Const. art. II, § 3), the President is Commander in Chief of the armed forces
(U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl. 1), makes treaties and appoints "superior" officers
with advice and consent of the Senate (U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.2) and
by inference may remove them )Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926))
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or to the national judiciary, 12 respectively. In the Constitution there
are also prohibitions against the exercise of certain powers, in some
cases by the national government alone,' 3 in other cases by the
State governments only,14 in still others by either. 5 Interpretative
amendments provide that "the enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
unless their positions are considered to have mixed executive-legislative or
executive-judicial functions in which non-executive elements predominate
(Rathbun v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)). The power of the President
to control and direct the executive branch is further evidenced by authority
to commission all officers of the United States (U.S. Const. art. II, § 3) and
to require opinions in writing from principal officers of executive departments
upon any subject relating to departmental duties (U.S. Const. art. II, § 2,
cl. 1). His control of communications with foreign states is suggested by his
appointment of ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls accredited to
them, and his power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers from
them (U.S. Const. art. II, § 3). Implied in these powers is the right to recognize foreign states and governments. He also possesses facilities for legislative
leadership in his duties to give the Congress information on the state of the
Union and to recommend appropriate measures (ibid.).
12. Originally the judicial power of the United States extended, inter
alia, to cases arising under the Constitution, statutes, and treaties, those
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, controversies to which the United States was a
party and those "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects" (U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1). The importance of the
courts in the definition of the treaty power will become apparent in what
follows. In cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls
the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction (U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2),
but this has been held not to exclude state jurisdiction as to a subject traditionally within it. Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930). Since
the eleventh amendment states have not ieen subject to suit by citizens or subjects of other states, domestic or foreign, and by judicial interpretation states
may not be sued by foreign states without their consent. Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313 (1934).
13. Prohibitions of suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, of capitation or direct taxes except in proportion to population (except as allowed
by the sixteenth amendment), of commercial or revenue regulations favoring
the ports of one state as against another, of withdrawing money from the
Treasury except with appropriation by law and accounting (U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 9) ; also the prohibitions against infringement of personal liberties in the
first eight amendments.
14. Prohibitions against entering "into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation," or without the consent of Congress "into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign power"; against granting
letters of marque or reprisal, imposing import or tonnage duties, maintaining
troops or warships in time of peace, engaging in war unless invaded or in
imminent danger; and against coining money, emitting bills of credit, making
anything but gold and silver coin legal tender, or passing laws which impair
the obligation of a contract (U.S. Const. art. I, § 10) ; also the important restrictions for the protection of civil liberties in the fourteenth amendment,
prohibiting laws which "abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States" and measures which deprive anyone of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law" or deny to any person within the state
jurisdiction "the equal protection of the laws."
15. Prohibition of bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, export taxes,
and granting of titles of nobility (U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cls. 3, 5, 8; art. I,
§ 10, cls. 1, 2) ; also the restrictions against interference with personal libert
and suffrage in the thirteenth, fifteenth, and nineteenth amendments.
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retained by the people,"1 and "the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."' 7 Nevertheless, judicial interpretation has attributed to the national
government certain powers thought to be implied by the delegation
of enumerated powers as appropriate to facilitate the exercise of the
latter ;18 also some additional powers said to result from the possession of a coherent group of enumerated powers. 19
It is impossible to review here the particulars of the familiar
debate which has run through our constitutional history between
those disposed respectively to a liberal or to a strict construction
of the powers delegated to the national government. If the result
has been generally favorable to a liberal view of the scope of
enumerated powers it is nevertheless necessary to consider the terms
in which each individual power is granted. In so far as the broader
debate may be relevant to the treaty power it will suffice to recall
the construction which has been given to the tenth amendment. In
the view of James Madison, who sponsored the amendment, it
merely confirmed the distribution of powers in the Constitution and
provided no additional guaranty of State powers which must be
considered immune from interference by the exercise of delegated
powers. 20 Thus the problem was simply to determine the scope of
the powers enumerated or implied. In the same spirit Marshall
observed that the national government, "though limited in its
powers, is supreme" within its sphere of action. Further, he found:
no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation, 2' excludes incidental or implied powers; and which
requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely
described. Even the 10th amendment, which was framed for the
purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been
excited, omits the word 'expressly,' and declares only that the
powers 'not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to
16. U.S. Const. amend. IX.
17. U.S. Const. amend. X. To avoid confusion "States" (initial capital
letter will be used in this paper to refer to States which are members of the
international community, subjects of international law; states (lower case)

will be used to refer to the 48 states of the United States.
18. The doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316

(1819).
19. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821). See also 1
Works of Hamilton 185 (Lodge ed. 1885) ; 3 Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution 124 (1st ed. 1833); 1 Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the
United States 76-84 (2d ed. 1929).
20. 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791). For a good brief summary of
judicial construction of the tenth amendment, which I have followed, see
Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today 232-37 (11th ed. 1954).

21. Articles of Confederation art. II. "Each state retains

power ...

not expressly delegated...."

. . . every
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the States, are reserved to the States or to the people;' thus
leaving the question, whether the particular power which may
become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one
government, or prohibited to the other,
to depend on a fair
22
construction of the whole instrument.
"Fair construction," which for Marshall admitted a liberal construction of implied powers and the "necessary and proper" clause,
is a standard subject to judicial predilections. The Taney court
considered certain matters of internal police as an exclusive preserve
of State jurisdiction.2 3 After the Civil War state instrumentalities
were held to be exempt from the national income tax,24 a position
abondoned only in 1939.25 In construing the interstate commerce

power the Supreme Court was at first content to rest upon the
inherent limitations of the clause in rejecting national legislation, 26
while upholding as within the power other national regulations
which appeared equally to invade the reserved area.27 Finally, by a
narrow majority in Hammer v. Dagenhar,28 the Court not only
relied upon the tenth amendment as expressing an area of "local
power always existing and carefully reserved to the States," but
even permitted Mr. Justice Day to ignore Marshall's argument and
to misquote the amendment in his assertion "that the Nation is
made up of States to which are entrusted the powers of local government. And to them and to the people the powers not expressly
delegated to the National Government are reserved. '29 There followed a period in which the Court occasionally upheld national
regulation of the production of goods destined for interstate commerce, but rejected it in a series of important cases 0 terminating
with its holding that the live poultry code under the National Industrial Recovery Act was an infringement of reserved powers
22. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 406 (1819).
23. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573-74 (1847) ; New York v.
Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
24. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
25. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
26. Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908) ; United States v.
DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1870).
27. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917)
(interstate transportation of liquor) ; Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308
(1913) (Mann Act) ; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911)
(Pure Food and Drug Act) ; Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (interstate transportation of lottery tickets).
28. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
29. 247 U.S. at 275 (emphasis added).
30. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (coal produced outside federal quota regulations) ; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)
(tax for subsidized crop quota limitations); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44
(1922) (sale of grain futures in markets not complying with federal regulations); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (products of
child labor).
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because the matters regulated affected interstate commerce only
"indirectly." 3' 1 Finally, the Court abandoned this approach and
returned to Marshall's view of the tenth amendment in sustaining
the Social Security Act, 32 National Labor Relations Act, 33 and Fair

Labor Standards Act,34 expressly overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart.
We shall see that the vacillating construction of the tenth
amendment apparent in these applications to domestic powers has
not been characteristic in the Court's handling of the question
whether the treaty power can invade reserved power areas. 35 Only
in the Taney period was it seriously contended that treaties might
be limited solely upon the ground of intrusion into areas considered
to be reserved for legislative purposes to the States. Yet it seems
probable that disagreement upon this point by judges in some state
courts and by a few publicists may stem from the failure of the
Court to deal as consistently with internal as with external powers.
Mr. Justice Holmes' well known refusal to regard a treaty which
contravened no prohibitory words of the Constitution as "forbidden
by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth
Amendment,"3 6 although fully consistent with the practice of the
Court, has continued to attract criticism.
In considering the Supreme Court's attitude toward external
powers account must be taken of the position urged by Mr. Justice
T
Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp
Distinguishing sharply the powers of the national government in
external affairs from its domestic powers, he asserted that the latter
are not even restricted to the enumerated, implied, and resultant
powers of the constitutional distribution. This conclusion was based
upon his assumption that the states never possessed international
powers and therefore could not have delegated them to the national
government. He considered that these powers were lodged during
31. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935).
32. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
33. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
34. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), overruling Hammer
v. Dagenhart at 312 U.S. 116-17.
35. See Part II of this article infra.
36. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
37. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Sutherland's argument had been developed at
greater length in a course of lectures delivered at Columbia University before
he entered the Court: Constitutional Power and World Affairs (1919). Suggestions of his historical analysis are found in Mr. Justice Patterson's opinion
in Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 80-81 (1795) and in Rufus King's
remarks in the Federal Convention of 1787, 1 Farrand, The Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787, at 323 (2d ed. 1937) (hereinafter cited as Farrand).
Cf. the views of Luther Martin and James Wilson, 1 Farrand 324, 329.
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the colonial period exclusively in the British Crown, from which
they passed "not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in
their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of
America." During the revolution the Continental Congress, and
afterwards the Congress of the Confederation, had acted as the
sole vehicles of external sovereignty; hence the States had never
possessed it.
It results that the investment of the federal government with
the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the
affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare
and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain
diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never
been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the
federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.
...The power to acquire territory by discovery and occupation
. . . , the power to expel undesirable aliens.... the power to

make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties
in the constitutional sense..., none of which is expressly affirmed by the Constitution, nevertheless exist as inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality."
Sutherland's historical argument can be dismissed as ill founded:
there is abundant evidence that the states in the period before the
Constitution did engage in diplomacy, conclude treaties, and enter
confederations."0 They also obstructed and defeated the operation
of treaties made by the Congress, so that it became a principal issue
of the Convention of 1787 what additional powers were required
40
in the national government to enable it to curtail these activities.
38. 299 U.S. at 318 (1936).
39. See Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr.
Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 Yale L.J. 467 (1946) (for a full discussion
of the historical data) ; see also Scott, Treaty Making under the Authority
of the United States, 28 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 2-34 (1934) ; Small, The Beginnings of American Nationality, 8 Johns Hopldns U. Studies in History
and Political Science (1890); Van Tyne, Sovereignty in the American
Revolution: An HistoricalStudy, 12 Am. Hist Rev. 529 (1907).
40. The Randolph resolutions proposed to give the national legislature
authority "to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening
in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of union" to which
was added, on Franklin's motion, "or any Treaties subsisting under the
authority of the union." 1 Farrand 19, 21, 47, 54. In the debate on this*proposal Pinckney argued the power must be universal to be effective, "that the
States must be kept in due subordination to the nation; that if the States were
left to act to themselves in any case, it [would] be impossible to defend the
national prerogatives, however extensive they might be on paper; that the
acts of Congress had been defeated by this means; nor had foreign treaties
escaped repeated violations. . . ." Id. at 164. Madison supported him: "Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to encroach on the
federal authority; to violate national Treaties, to infringe the rights & interests
of each other. .

.

. This prerogative of the General [Government] is the

great pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of the
States; which, without it, will continually fly out of their proper orbits
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The doctrine also presents logical difficulties in that grants of external powers are treated as surplusage but prohibitions are not. If
the regulation of foreign commerce be considered as an inherent
rather than a delegated power of the national government it is
difficult to see upon what ground that government can be forbidden
to levy an export tax. For what it may be worth the doctrine is
also out of harmony with the orthodox constitutional theory of
Webster that sovereignty resides in the people of the United States,
who have by the Constitution divided the exercise of it between the
national government and the states, except as reserved to themselves. On this view inherent, unlimited powers inhere in the state
but not in the government or government of the state, as was said
of the treaty power at the outset. The constituent power of amending the Constitution seems theoretically inconsistent with the assumption that either level of government possesses inherent powers
unless it be argued that there are areas of governmental functions
beyond the reach of the amending power.
It is undeniable that exercises of external power have occasionally
been sustained by the Supreme Court upon a theory of inherent
powers, 41 and that impressive support has been given to that theory
by distinguished writers. 42 Yet it seems doubtful that any case has
and destroy the order & harmony of the political system." Id. at 164-65.
Elbridge Gerry, however, thought the unlimited negative "a leap in the dark,"
and the representatives of small states generally feared it. Id. at 165-68, 170.
When Patterson's plan was presented Madison opposed it as inadequate: "1.
Will it prevent those violations of the law of nations and of Treaties which if
not prevented must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars? The tendency
of the States to these violations has been manifested in sundry instances. The
files of Conigress contain complaints already, from almost every nation with
which treaties have been formed. . . . The existing confederacy does not
sufficiently provide against this evil. The proposed amendment to it does not
supply the omission. It leaves the will of the States as uncontrolled as ever."
Id. at 316. See also Madison's Preface to the debates, 3 Farrand 548. In the
end the negative was abandoned in favor of the injunctions of the supremacy
clause, proposed by Luther Martin. 2 Farrand 21, 22, 27-28. Cf. the comments
of Gerry and Martin upon it, 3 Farrand 273, 286-87.
41. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) ; Burnet v. Brooks,
288 U.S. 378 (1933); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) ; Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) ; Jones v. United States, 137 U.S.
202 (1890) ; The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
42. See Corwin, The Constitution and World Organization 16-20
(1944) ; McDougal and Lans, spra note 4, at 255-61. For President Theodore Roosevelt's emphatic denial "that what was imperatively necessary for
the Nation could not be done by the President unless he could find some
specific authorization for it," see Roosevelt, Autobiography 57 (1927). The
acquisition of territory by the United States, for which no enumerated power
can be shown has been considered to rest upon inherent powers. However,
Marshall held it could be inferred from the specific powers of making war
and treaties. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828).
Cf. 1 Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States, § 236 (2d ed.
1929). Jefferson, who recognized that the power was not specified in the
Constitution, made no defense of the purchase of Louisiana as an exercise of
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yet occurred which involved exercises of power that could not,
"on a fair construction of the whole instrument," have been sustained without invoking inherent powers. There have been indica43
tions of a disposition to set bounds to Justice Sutherland's doctrine
inherent powers; he merely suggested that Congress, "risking themselves
like faithful servants," must "throw themselves on their country for doing
for them unauthorized, what we know they would have done for themselves
had they been in a situation to do it." 4 The Works of Thomas Jefferson
500-01 (Washington ed. 1884). The power to act in defense of national
security has often been considered inherent. Mr. justice Bradley in the Legal
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 556 (1871), said that to defend its
security the federal government "is invested with all those inherent and implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution, were generally
considered to belong to every government as such, and as being essential to the
exercise of its functions." See also Inr re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582 (1895). But
more recently Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said that "even the all-embracing
power and duty of self-preservation are not absolute. Like the war power,
which is indeed an aspect of the power of self-preservation, it is subject
to applicable constitutional limitations. . . . The First Amendment is such
a restriction." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 520 (1951).
43. In United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 -(1937), Justice Sutherland relied on the Curtiss-Wright case in giving effect to the Litvinov Assignment, an executive agreement, despite a contrary policy of New York. However, on nearly the same facts, Justices Douglas and Frankfurter in United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) avoided the Sutherland thesis. Douglas
attributed to Sutherland the view that "the conduct of foreign affairs is committed by the Constitution to the political department of the Federal Government" (id. at 222-23), which is not Sutherland's position, and also declares
for strict construction of treaties and agreements to avoid derogation from
State authority "unless clearly necessary to effectuate the national policy."
(Id. at 230.) Frankfurter finds ample basis in the power of the President to
recognize governments and to settle foreign claims without mention of
inherent powers (id. at 237-38, 240-41). In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), there is a strong minority argument by
Chief Justice Vinson for upholding the President's power to seize the steel
industry, but it rests less explicitly on inherent authority than upon need to
act to implement foreign policies expressed in treaties and statutes (id. at
668-72). In concurring with the majority Jackson dismisses the CurtissWright doctrine as in large part dictum, and in any case inapplicable because concerned with presidential conduct in external affairs and in harmony
with legislation. He suggests it will be difficult to sustain presidential acts incompatible with the expressed will of congress (id. at 635-38 & n. 2). Nor does
he find support for enlarged domestic powers to implement military measures
initiated by the President: ".

.

. no doctrine that the Court could promulgate

would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a President whose
control of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country
by his own commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture." (Id. at 642.) Justice Burton, concurring, asks: "Does the President,
in such a situation, have inherent constitutional power to seize private property which makes congressional action in relation thereto unnecessary? We
find no such power available to him under the present circumstances. The present
situation is not comparable to that of an imminent invasion or threatened
attack. We do not face the issue of what might be the President's constitutional power to meet such catastrophic situations." (Id. at 659.) Justice Clark,
although well disposed toward extensive presidential authority "in times of
grave and imperative national emergency," whether called "residual," "inherent," "moral," "implied," "aggregate," "emergency," or otherwise, yet
finds that the President must follow any specific procedures laid down by the
Congress to meet the emergency (id. at 662).

,
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culminating in a frontal attack upon it by four Justices of the Supreme Court in the case of Reid v. Covert. Speaking for them Mr.
Justice Black said:
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States
acts against citizens abroad [in a court martial trial of civilian
dependents of servicemen] it can do so free of the Bill of Rights.
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its
power and authority have no other source. It can only act in
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution....4

Of course, it is fair to ask whether a free use of the conceptions
of implied powers and resultant powers, with a liberal allowance of
what is "necessary and proper" to execute them - constructions
very likely to respond to preconceptions of what powers the national government ought to exercise - is in substance different from
stating powers which are "a necessary concomitant of nationality. ' ' 45
Yet there is practical restraint in the conception of a government of
limited powers even when we concede that legal construction of
such powers may reflect the vagaries of men.4 6 In the long pull is
not a theory of delegated powers better calculated to discourage
.vagaries than one of inherent powers?
B. PROVISIONs AFFECTING THE TREATY POWER
With respect to the treaty power there are specific provisions of
the Constitution which relate to (a) location of the treaty power
within the federal system, (b) international agreements other than
treaties, (c) the position of treaties in the internal law of the United
States, (d) separation of powers and checks and balances in the
making of treaties.
Art. I, Sec. 10, Cl. 1: No State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation;...
Art. I, Sec. 10, Cl. 3: No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress, . . enter into any Agreement or Compact, with another State, or with a Foreign Power; ...

Art. II, Sec. 2, Cl. 2: He [the President] shall have Power,
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur;...
Art. VI, Cl. 2: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
44. 354 U.S. 1, 4 (1957). Two concurring justices appeared not to
object to this expression of principle. For further discussion of the case see

Section II, infra.

45. Cf. McDougal and Lans, supra note 4, at 260 n. 214.
46. See the thoughtful remarks in McBain, The Living Constitution
37-40 (1934).
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the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Mindful "that it is a constitution we are exponding," one "intended to endure for ages and to be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs," 47 we shall expect to gather the import of these
clauses for our own day from the w'hole course of judicial interpretation and practice. What the framers of the Constitution meant
by what they said is of interest mainly in providing starting points
and perhaps in dispelling a few misconceptions which have had
traumatic effect upon later interpreters. In fact we cannot on some
points establish from the record just what the founding fathers did
mean, and are led to conclude they either were deliberately obscure 48 or failed in the debate to seize the issues which have since
puzzled us.
(1). Location of the Treaty Power in the FederalSystem
It seems clear from the prohibitions in article I, section 10, 49 that
it was intended to exclude the states from the powers essential for
the conduct of foreign relations. They are not permitted to regulate
or tax foreign trade, nor to maintain troops or warships in time of
peace, nor to make war except in self-defense, nor to enter into
treaties, alliances, or confederations. On the other hand these powers
are specifically vested in agencies of the national government by
enumeration. 0
With respect to the treaty power the principle of excluding the
states was neither novel nor contested. Even in the less centralized
union of states under the Articles of Confederation in which each
state was said to retain "sovereignty, freedom and independence, and
every Power, Jurisdiction and Right" not expressly delegated to
the United States,"1 it was thought necessary to secure the conduct
of foreign relations to the national government by prohibiting separate states from sending or receiving embassies or from entering
"into any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty with any King
prince or state.

'5 2

The Articles assigned to the national Congress

47. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819);
Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 439 (1884).
48. Abraham Baldwin, a member of the Convention, told the first Congress that the framers were well aware "some subjects were left a little
ambiguous and uncertain," to be "settled by practice or by amendments in the
progress of the Government. He believed this subject of the rival powers of
legislation and Treaty was one of them ... ." 3 Farrand 370.
49. See notes 14, 15 supra.
50. See notes 9, 10, 11, 12 supra.

51. Articles of Confederation art. II.
52. Articles of Confederation art. VI.
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"the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and
war,... sending and receiving ambassadors -

entering into treaties

and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made
whereby the legislative power of the respective states shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as
their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever. . . ."3 Although the treaty power was thus given to the Con-

gress that body was forbidden to enter into any treaty or alliance
without the assent of nine of the states.
The records of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 disclose
almost nothing about the framing of the provisions in article I, section 10. These clauses were not included in either the Randolph
resolutions or the Patterson plan, both of which exhibit concern
not over the question of excluding states from making treaties,
which seems to have been taken for granted, but over the measures
appropriate to prevent states from continuing to violate or obstruct
treaties made by the national government. A committee of detail
introduced the provisions in article I, section 10, which were evidently suggested by language of the Articles of Confederation;
Pinckney's plan seems to have contained a similar proposal, probably drawn from the same source.5 4 From one of the committee's
papers, in the handwriting of James Wilson, it appears that the
original draft was simply, "No State shall enter into Treaty, Alliance or Confederation," after which is inserted in John Rutledge's
hand, "with any foreign Power nor with[ou]t Cons[en]t of U.S.
into any agreemt. or compact w[it]h any other another State or
Power." When the committee reported its completed draft to the
Convention on August 6, Wilson's point had been placed with the
prohibitions against coinage of money, issuance of letters of marque
and reprisal, and grants of nobility in article XII as actions absohtely forbidden to the states. Rutledge's addition had passed into
article XIII along with emitting bills of credit, making anything
but specie legal tender, taxing imports, keeping troops and ships in
time of peace, or engaging in war unless invaded or in imminent
53. Articles of Confederation art. IX.
54. 2 Farrand 135, 169, 187. The language of article VI of the Articles
of Confederation forbids the states absolutely to "enter into any conference,
agreement, alliance or treaty with any King, prince or state ;" in a second
paragraph it proceeds, "No two or more States [of the Union] shall enter
into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without
the consent of the united states in congress assembled, specifying accurately
the purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall
continue."
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danger, as conduct permitted to the states only with the consent of
Congress. Debate upon articles XII and XIII was confined to proposed amendments not affecting the clauses about treaties and
agreements.5 As a result of minor revisions by the committee of
style and some final shuffling of clauses by the Convention, article
XII became clause 1 and article XIII was divided to become clauses
2 and 3 of article I, section 10, of the Constitution. 8
The fact that the treaty power was thus denied to the states and
granted to the national government without debate can be understood if placed in context. The members of the Convention fully
appreciated the need for unified action in the conduct of foreign
relations ;57 for them the issue was what interests the central agency
which conducted them would represent and how it would be controlled. It was necessary to determine first the manner of electing
the President and the basis of representation in the two houses of
the Congress. When these issues had been resolved after a long debate by major compromises, it became possible to place the treaty
power in the hands of the President, subject to advice and consent
of the Senate, because the large- and small-state interests were both
represented in this separation of powers. 58 After that it was indeed
only a question of detail to draft the prohibitions of article I, section 10.
(2). Executive Agreements
The absence of reported discussion of article I, section 10, makes
it impossible to determine whether the framers of the Constitution
were sensitive to the possibility of executive agreements, for clause
3 is the only reference to them in the Constitution. A distinction is
implied in the absolute prohibition of state "treaties, alliances, or
confederations," as against the qualified injunction against state
"agreements or compacts" unless made with the consent of Congress. Elsewhere the Constitution stiuplated that treaties were to
be made by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate
without mentioning in any way a power of the national government
to enter into agreements or compacts other than treaties.
What is to be inferred from these facts? Perhaps the language
chosen is in some degree careless or fortuitous, but how far can one
55. 2 Farrand 169, 187, 435, 439-43.
56. 2 Farrand 577, 596, 619. In the collection in Farrand's third volume
of papers and correspondence of members of the convention commenting on
the Constitution there are a number of references to prohibitions in art I,
§ 10, but none to those affecting treaties and agreements.
57. See note 40 supra.
59. See section (4) infra.
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press such a conjecture? Not only did the committee of detail
modify Wilson's draft in order to preserve both the absolute and
the qualified prohibitions found in the Articles of Confederation, but
in doing so it changed the language of both clauses. What is absolutely prohibited is no longer any "conference, agreement, alliance
or treaty" with a foreign state but "any treaty, alliance, or confederation." What is conditionally forbidden is no longer "any treaty,
confederation or alliance" between two or more states of the Union,
but "any agreement or compact" between states of the Union or
between a state and a foreign power. Whatever conjectures may be
advanced as to the reasons for such variations it seems unlikely
that the framers thought of "treaty," "agreement," and "compact"
as wholly syonymous terms.
However, it must be remembered that early discussion of the
treaty power on the basis of the Randolph resolutions did not have
the benefit of the separation of powers decision under which our
"treaties" must be defined, as instruments made by the President
but ratified only with the consent of the Senate; Randolph had proposed that "the National Legislature [bicameral] ought to be impowered to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the
Confederation," whereas the "National Executive ...to be chosen
by the National Legislature," should "enjoy the Executive rights
vested in Congress by the Confederation.""9 Whether treaty making
was to be considered an executive or legislative function or both he
did not intimate. The separation of powers point had not been
settled when Wilson and Rutledge drafted the words of article I.
section 10. Patterson's plan retained the Congress of the Articles of
Confederation, merely adding to its powers, which had included
treaty making.60 Hamilton had suggested the pattern of treaty
making finally adopted but in a very different context, for his chief
executive and Senate were to serve during good behavior, i.e., for
life;"1 however, he did not formally propose his plan. Pinckney's
proposals excluded the states but did not cover the mode of making
treaties, 62 and the committee on detail itself proposed that the
Senate should make treaties.63 What then did they mean by an
"agreement or compact" other than a "treaty"? Were they differentiating in terms of the method of making at all? If so, did they think
in terms of the pattern of treaty making used by the states (after
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

1 Farrand 21.
1 Farrand 243.
1 Farrand 282-93, at 292.
2 Farrand 134-37, art. 9.
2 Farrand 183 (art. IX [VIII]).
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all, article I, section 10 is a limitation on the states), or in terms of
one of the proposed methods before the Convention? It seems arguable that they were merely throwing in lawyer's language to cover
such other possible but as yet undefinable international agreements
as might be made; yet this would be a vague basis upon which to
found a sharp difference in the extent of the limitation.
To belabor such meager evidence at this late date is unprofitable.
It has been suggested that if the framers conceived of agreements or
compacts other than treaties in the context of state action they
would not have rejected this possibility in national action. Perhaps
this is true even though they failed to define -their terms. True, they
specifically assigned the treaty power to the national government,
and said nothing of what we now call executive agreements. But we
can hardly argue here expressio rnius est exclusio alterius, for both
powers may be granted - treaties by enumeration, executive agreements by implication or as "necessary and proper" 64 to carry into
execution the broad range of powers with respect to foreign affairs
delegated to the national government. This position is ably developed by McDougal and Lans, who argue :65
Unless one takes the position that the Framers sought to deny
to the Federal Government the power to use techniques of agreement made available to the states - an argument completely
refuted by the debates at the Convention 6 and by contemporaneous history -the conclusion is inescapable that the Federal
Government was intended to have the power to make 'agreements' or 'compacts.' The fact that - despite the broad grants of
substantive power set out above, the permissive formulation of
the treaty-making clause, and the express recognition of agreements other than treaties - the power to make agreements other
than treaties was not granted in more express terms, can
seriously concern only those who make something especially
mystical out of 'the power to make agreements.' As has been
indicated above, when broken into its component parts, 'the
power to make agreements' includes several clearly distinguishable powers, among which are the power to conduct negotia64. "Necessary and proper," of course, in the sense developed by
Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819):
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional." In Marshall's sense is it not "'necessary and proper" in
exercising the power to regulate foreign commerce for the Congress to
authorize the President to make reciprocal trade agreements? Is it not
implied in the President's power as Commander in Chief that he may conclude executive agreements with allies concerning strategy or troop dispositions or materiel?
65. McDougal and Lans, supra note 4, at 221-23.
66. Sed quaere, whether they either asserted or refuted it.
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tions with foreign governments and the power to frame the
policies for controlling such negotiations. It can scarcely be
denied that the President needs no new powers beyond those
expressly granted to him in the document to enable him to conduct negotiations with other governments and that he has the
exclusive power to conduct such negotiations. Nor would it
appear that any effective question can be raised about the powers
of the whole Congress and the President either to frame policies
for controlling the conduct of negotiations or to make any agreements concluded the law of the land. From a practical perspective, all the President requires to make his negotiations with
other governments effective is an assurance, on problems demanding commitments beyond his own powers to fulfill, that the
Congress will honor his negotiations and assist in fulfilling all
necessary commitments. For the giving of such assurance by the
Congress, the broad legislative powers outlined above would
appear to be fully ample. It is thus clear that wholly apart from
the treaty-making clause, admittedly non-exclusive, the Constitution offers a completely adequate procedure for coping with
the whole problem of international agreements.
On this basis a flexible pattern permitting in some cases exclusively presidential, in others joint congressional-executive, agreements may be expected, a fact fully elaborated by McDougal and
Lans. The practice of the United States has actually corresponded
with these assumptions, which in the end is the real strength of
the position."'
(3). Treaties as the Law of the Land
Although there was little difference of opinion upon the basic
principle of locating the treaty power in the national government
and excluding states from exercising it, there was sharp disagreement about the sanctions needed to enforce this arrangement. When
the proposal of the Randolph resolutions to give the national
legislature a veto upon any state legislation contravening national
laws or treaties had been rejected, 68 the alternative advanced was a
guaranty of the position of the national constitution, laws, and
treaties as "the supreme law of the respective States," binding upon
their courts.
The Convention in committee of the whole had discussed the
Randolph resolutions informally from May 30 to June 14, postponing action on the veto proposal, and representatives of the
67. For examples of the several types and the extremely varied subject
matter of executive agreements in United States practice see Plischke, Conduct of Anterican. Diplomacy 306-19 (1950); McDougal and Lans, supra
note 4, at 261-82. See also section III, and the appendix by Gary J. Meyer

infra.

68.

See note 40 supra.
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smaller states had become disatisfied with the trend of the debate.
They requested a short adjournment to prepare an alternative plan,
which was proposed on June 15 by William Patterson, of New
Jersey, as a substitute for the Randolph plan. The Patterson resolusions, as reported in Madison's notes, contained the following
form of supremacy clause :69

6. Resd. that all Acts of the U. States in Congs. made by virtue
& in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the articles of confederation vested in them, and all Treaties made & ratified under
the authority of the U. States shall be the supreme law of the
respective States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties shall
relate to the said States or their Citizens, and that the Judiciary
of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions,
any thing in the respective laws of the Individual States to the
contrary notwithstanding; and that if any State, or any body of
men in any State shall oppose or prevent ye. carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal Executive shall be authorized to call forth ye power of the Confederated States, or
so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an
obedience to such Acts, or an Observance of such Treaties.
When we consider the implications of this language we must
remember that those who drafted it wanted only a revision of the
Articles of Confederation, with some strengthening of the central
government. They thought still in terms of "sovereign" states.
Hence the consistency of "Treaties ... under the authority of the
U. States" as "supreme law of the respective States," to be enforced
by "ye power of the Confederated States." In their view it is
the states which make treaties, making them not directly but
through their agency for external affairs, the national government; thus treaties are concluded under the authority of the "United
States" in a sense no different than "Confederated States," used in
the same section. The authority is conceived to be in the states, the
administration in the national government."
Within this conceptual framework the drafters appreciated the
need for assuring concerted action in treaty making, for they went
pretty far in authorizing direct action by the national executive. Yet
we must again remember the context of the Confederation, which
Randolph called "government by supplication"; it was one thing "to
call forth ye power of the Confederated States," quite another to
obtain any effective response to the call. The provision was not un69. 1 Farrand 245.
70. See Scott, sipra note 39, at 17-20, for a useful development of this
view; his application of it to the final form of the supremacy clause may
suggest the manner in which the representatives of small states construed it,
but is hardly an acceptable view for today.
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like the United Nations collective security system today; the possibility of action depends upon the interests of the member states.
It is important to an understanding of the phraseology of article
VI, clause 2, of the Constitution to trace its evolution from the
original proposal. When the Patterson plan had been set aside and
the Convention returned to the Randolph resolutions as a basis of
discussion, the proposal for a negative upon state laws contravening
national statutes and treaties was brought to a vote and defeated.7'1
Luther Martin, of Maryland, then proposed the following supremacy clause, which modifies slightly the clause in the Patterson plan:
Resolved that the legislative acts of the United States made by
virtue and in pursuance of the articles of Union and all Treaties
made'and ratified under the authority of the United States shall
be the supreme law of the respective States as far as those acts
or Treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citizens and
Inhabitants - and that the judiciaries of the several States shall
be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective
72
laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding.
There is no report of debate upon this proposal - only the
Journal record: "which passed unanimously in the affirmative ;"
and Madison's even more laconic: "which was agreed to nem:
con :.,,The next step was an amended form proposed by Rutledge
on August 23:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States made in
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of
the United-States, shall be the supreme law of the several States,
and of their Citizens and inhabitants; and the Judges in the
several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions; any
thing in the Constitutions7 4or laws of the several States to the
contrary notwithstanding.
This too was adopted unanimously, and there is no record of
any debate - a singular fact in view of the striking increase in
national control implied in: (1) making all treaties, not merely
those which relate to the states and their citizens and inhabitants,
the supreme law of the states; (2) making treaties superior not only
to the laws but also to the constitutions of the states; (3) substituting "Judges in" for "Judiciaries of" the several states, thus
opening the way for consideration of conflicts between treaties and
71. Cf. Madison's comments on the insufficiency of the Patterson plan
to prevent contraventions by the States: note 40 supra. He continued to advocate a veto power in the national legislature. 2 Farrand 27-28, 589.
72. 2 Farrand 22, 28-29. Martin may have been one of the group which
concerted the Patterson plan.
73. 2 Farrand 22, 29.
74. 2 Farrand 381-82 (Journal), 389 (Madison's notes).

THE SCOPE OF THE TREATY POWER

the state constitutions or laws by a federal judiciary, which in fact
was later provided. Of course the members of the Convention could
not have foreseen the institutional consequences of the doctrine of
judicial review, which was permitted rather than authorized by the
Constitution, nor could they have anticipated fully the ascendancy
of the federal courts under the judiciary acts in matters affecting the
Constitution, national laws, and treaties."
On August 25 Madison proposed a further amendment to change
"treaties made under the authority of the United States" to "treaties
made, or which shall be made, under authority of the United States."
"This insertion," he explained, "was meant to obviate all doubt
concerning the force of treaties pr~existing, by making the words
75. Nevertheless, if Luther Martin did not rise to the occasion in the
Convention, he did show clear appreciation of the consequences of these
changes during the debate on ratification in Maryland. In the Maryland
Journal of February 29, 1788 (reprinted 3 Farrand 271-75) "The Landholder"
(Oliver Ellsworth), after twigging Martin unmercifully about his tendency
to run on for two or three hours whenever he rose to speak, went on to
credit him (not in compliment) with originating the supremacy clause. Martin
replied in three long letters which go far to support Ellsworth's charge of
prolixity. In the letter of March 19, 1788, he says (3 Farrand 287) :
When this clause was introduced, it was not established that inferior
continental courts should be appointed for trial of all questions arising
on treaties and on the laws of the general government, and it was my wish
and hope that every question of that kind would have been determined in
the first instance in the courts of the respective states; had this been the
case, the propriety and the necessity that treaties duly made and ratified,
and the laws of the general government, should be made binding on the
state judiciaries which were to decide upon them, must be evident to every
capacity, while at the same time, if such treaties or laws were inconsistent with our constitution and bill of rights, the judiciaries of this state
would be bound to reject the first and abide by the last, since in the form
I introduced the clause, notwithstanding treaties and the laws of the
general government were intended to be superior to the laws of our
state government, where they should be opposed to each other, yet that
they were not proposed nor meant to be superior to our constitution and
bill of rights. It was afterwards altered and amended (if it can be called
an amendment) to the form in which it stands in the system now published, and as inferior continental, and not state courts, are originally to
decide on those questions, it is now worse than useless, for being so
altered as to render the treaties and laws maie under our federal government superior to our constitution, if the system is adopted it will amount
to a total and unconditional surrender to that government, by the citizens
of this state, of every right and privilege secured to them by our constitution, and an express compact and stipulation with the general government that it may, at its discretion, make laws in direct violation of those
rights....

In his "Objections to this Constitution of Government," George Mason said
(2 Farrand 639):
By declaring all treaties supreme laws of the land, the Executive and
the Senate have, in many cases, an exclusive power of legislation; which
might have been avoided by proper distinctions with respect to treaties,
and requiring the assent of the House of Representatives, where it could
be done with safety.
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'all treaties made' to refer to them, as the words inserted would
refer to future treaties. ' 76 This of course passed nern. con.; it would
have failed to meet the very problems in the framers' minds had the
supremacy clause been held inapplicable to treaties made under the
Articles of Confederation.
No other changes were made except by the committee of style,
which substituted "supreme law of the land" for "supreme law of
the several States, and of their citizens and inhabitants. 77 Although
no notice appears to have been taken of this in the final debate, it
seems something more than a stylistic change, implying as it does a
unified legal community. By easy stages the work of Mr. Patterson
and his small-state colleagues, which so strikingly reflected their
wish to perpetuate the Confederation, had been transformed into the
8
effective instrument of a strong federal state.7
These changes show how it came about that article VI, clause 2,
refers to laws made in pursuance of the Constitution, but to treaties
made or to be made under the authority of the United States. In the
Patterson draft the reference was to acts of the Congress "in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the articles of confederation vested
in them"; since the states made the Articles of Confederation and
would have had to agree to any amendments this was much the same
as saying "under the authority of the United States." The states
would have been acting through their delegates in a Congress which
was in form a diplomatic conference, and the treaties negotiated
required the assent of most of the states before ratification. But
after the Convention had projected a federal state under a new
76. 2 Farrand 417.
77. 2 Farrand 572, 603.

78. Contemporary reaction to the clause was mixed; it was extensively

discussed in ratification conventions in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Caro-

linas in both theoretical and practical terms. There was a difference of opinion
how far international practice required that treaties be the law of the
land; some urged that in English and French practice legislative assent
would be needed to give internal effect to treaties which violated fundamental liberties or existing statutes, dismembered the realm, etc. But there
was also strong support for the view that unless internal obligations under
treaties were punctually discharged the international position of the United
States would be damaged, and realization that although treaties were also the
law of the land in the Confederation the States had acted irresponsibly in
obstructing execution of them. See Elliot, The Debates in the Several State
Conventions (2d ed. 1836; facsimile reprint 1941) (hereinafter cited as
Elliot's Debates) ; in vol. III, 502-04 (Patrick Henry), 504 (Randolph), 50607 (George Nicholas), 507-09 (George Mason), 509-10 (Corbin) ; in vol.
IV, 267-68, 312 (John Rutledge), 268 (Izard), 269-70 (Pringe), 270 (Ramsay),
270-71, 277-82
(Charles
Pinckney), 271-72, 308 (Lowndes).
See additional
references
as toCotesworth
treaties ceding
territory or rights to navigate
the Mississippi in note 86 infra; on separation of powers and checks and balances in treaty maling in notes 95, 97 ira. These topics are often mixed
with comments on the supremacy clause.
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Constitution it was necessary to refer to legislation pursuant to the
Constitution. With respect to treaties the retention of the phrase
"under the authority of the United States" 'was evidently intended to
include treaties made before the Constitution, a point on which
Madison's amendment was intended merely "to obviate all doubt."
There is nothing to suggest that the framers ever considered the
possibility that treaties inconsistent with the Constitution might
become the supreme law of the land. The supremacy clause was
formulated to prevent conduct inconsistent with or obstructive of
the national Constitution, statutes, and treaties, by the states, and
the phrasing used was calculated to assure that all treaties were
included. It was not devised with any notion of defining the relationships between the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties.
This is not to say that nothing about the relationship can be
deduced. It is only attributing common sense to the framers (and
no one questions that they were abundantly endowed with it) to
conclude that they did not suppose the supreme law of the land
could comprise three distinct elements - Constitution, statutes,
treaties - unless these elements were consistent with each other.
Of course one must go a step further, for it is possible that a treaty
and a statute, each consistent with the Constitution, may yet be inconsistent each with the other. There is no indication that the
point ever occurred to the framers, but the courts have also attributed common sense to them in assuming that in such9a conflict
they would have preferred the instrument later in time.7
The assumption that the words "in pursuance... of [the Constitution]" import a requirement of constitutionality for statutes,
where as the phrase "under the authority of the United States,"
applied to treaties, imports only a requirement of conformity with
procedural stipulations, seems rather more than the language will
clearly support. Is it not open to question whether "in pursuance
thereof" meant more than the formal acts prescribed to make the
statute ?8o Chief Justice Marshall did not rest the requirement that
79. For cases see notes 147, 148 infra.

80. A paraphrase of Holmes' words with respect to "under the authority
of the United States." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). The
only anticipation I have found of the recent debate over the words "in
pursuance thereof" occurred in the debates of the North Carolina ratification
convention, where David Caldwell remarked that "pursuance" was ambiguous:
"They may pursue bad as well as good measures. Another thing is remarkable,
that gentlemen, as an answer to every improper part of it [the Constitution],
tell us that every thing is to be done by our own representatives, who are
to be good men. There is no security that they will be so, or continue to be
so." Governor Johnston replied: "I do not know a word in the English
language so good as the word pursuance, to express the idea meant and
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statutes be consistent with the Constitution upon any such tenebrous
ground when he launched judicial review, but upon the simple
thesis that the Constitution was promulgated by authority of the
people as the fundamental law and therefore no act repugnant to it
can become the law of the land."- His reasoning applies as fully to
treaties as to statutes and can be avoided only if the treaty power is
conceived to be wholly or partly outside the Constitution. It is unlikely the framers of the Constitution so conceived it-they put it in.
(4). Separationof Powersin Treaty Making
Some consideration must be given to that provision in article II,
section II, clause II, of the Constitution which empowers the President to make treaties "by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate ...provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." As
an instance of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances between agencies of the national government it defined the
terms upon which the framers expected political interests to meet
and be reconciled in the exercise of the treaty power. Thus it set
practical bounds to the exercise of the power quite as significant as
any legal limitations.
intended by the Constitution. Can any one understand the sentence any other
way than this? When Congress makes a law in virtue of their constitutional
authority, it will be an actual law. I do not know a more expressive or a better
way of representing the idea by words. Every law consistent with the Constitution will have been made in pursuance of the powers granted by it. Every
usurpation or law repugnant to it cannot have been made in pursuance of its
powers. The latter will be nugatory and void." 4 Elliot's Debates 187-88.
81. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803):
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question . . .not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest.... That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles, as, in their opinion,
shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the
whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original
right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently
repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental.... The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and
that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is
written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed
by those intended to be restrained? ... It is a proposition too plain to be
contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to
it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution
is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or
it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is
alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part
of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then constitutions are absurd
attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature
illimitable.
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The course of the debates in the Convention of 1787 shows that
the members were keenly aware of the interdependence of powers
and political structures. It was this awareness which made it impossible for them to determine the agencies and the relationship of
these agencies within the national government which would exercise
the treaty power until the great compromises had been reached on
the bases of representation in the Senate and the House of Representatives, on apportionment and legislative terms, and on election
and tenure of the President.
Experience with the conduct of foreign relations under the
Articles of Confederation undoubtedly influenced the delegates. The
effort of the Continental Congress to use regular legislative methods
for foreign affairs questions had given way first to a standing committee, which was allowed to do little but correspond with American
agents overseas, then in 1781, to a Department of Foreign Affairs
under the direction of a Secretary for Foreign Affairs.8 2 In the
capable hands, successively, of Robert R. Livingston and John Jay
this administrative unit of the Congress had placed our diplomatic
relations and correspondence in some degree of order but had not
been able to solve the difficulties implicit in legislative direction of
such functions. Treaties had to be negotiated under special instructions drafted by the Congress for its envoys. 3 The inefficiency of
these arrangements contributed to the general dissatisfaction with
the Congress as a vehicle for executive operations which led the
members of the Convention to prefer a separate executive establishment. Even more important, perhaps, was the feeling of many delegates that a separate executive could be made a force for centralized
government as against a legislature dominated by state interest.
In 1786 Jay was authorized to negotiate a boundary convention
with Don Diego de Gardoqui, the Spanish minister to the United
States. Jay's request for appointment of a committee to instruct him
82. See the committee report recommending this, 19 Journals of the
Continental Congress 43.
83. Foster, A Century of American Diplomacy 96-101 (1900) ; Hunt,
The Department of State of the United States 14-53 (1914); Stuart, The
Department of State 2-12 (1949). It appears that the procedures for ratification were equally troublesome. Jacob Read told the Legislature of South
Carolina that "when the treaty should have been ratified, a sufficient number
of members could not be collected in Congress for that purpose; so that it

was necessary to despatch a frigate, at the expense of four thousand dollars,
with particular directions for Mr. Adams to use his endeavors to gain time.
His application proved successful; otherwise, very disagreeable consequences
might have ensued. The other case was, a party of Indians came to Princeton
for the purpose of entering into an amicable treaty with Congress; before it

could be concluded, a member went to Philadelphia to be married, and his
secession had nearly involved the western country in all the miseries of war."
4 Elliot's Debates 286.
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on all points was refused, but he was directed not to accept Spanish
proposals until he had laid them before the Congress. Nevertheless,
when the Spanish Government offered a broader agreement than had
been anticipated, Jay did initial an understanding covering commercial reciprocity and mutual guaranties of Spanish and United States
territories in America. As these were conditioned upon at least a
temporary relinquishment by the United States of navigation on the
lower Mississippi through Spanish territory, Jay asked the Congress
to modify his instructions to permit him to agree to such relinquishment for thirty years. In his view this would not be a waiver of the
basic right to navigation which the United States claimed as an
upper riparian state8 4 and (with even less persuasiveness) on the
basis of treaties; in thirty years, he believed, settlement of the west
would have increased our capacity to enforce our claim.1s The proposal set off a bitter debate in the Congress between seven eastern
and northern states, which thought it advantageous to give up navigation on the Mississippi for thirty years in exchange for commercial advantages in Spanish trade, and six southern and western
states, which considered the river outlet to New Orleans essential
to development of western agriculture. Although this slender majority sufficed to alter Jay's instructions it had become apparent that
nine states would not ratify a treaty relinquishing navigation; the
negotiations were therefore dropped.86 It seems probable from the
references to this incident in the Convention of 1787 and in the
ratification conventions of Virginia and North Carolina that it was
a principal reason for insistence that the Senate, in which all states
would have equal representation, must consent to treaties and must
do so by a two-thirds vote.87
Apart from the proposal of the Patterson plan to retain the old
84. The international law on this point was not settled. See The Faber
Case, German-Venezuelan Commission under Agreement of Feb. 13, 1903,
Ralston's Report, 600, citing many writers from Grotius to date; see Jefferson's view in his Report to the President [1792], 1 Foreign Rel. U.S. 252-57
(1832). See also 1 Hyde 526; 1 Moore, Digest of International Law 624
(1906) (hereinafter cited as Moore).
85. See Jay's speech to the Congress, Aug. 3, 1786, and Charles Pinckney's reply, Aug. 16, in Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy 52-60
(1947).
86. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States 75-80 (4th ed.
1955).
87. For the Convention of 1787, see 1 Farrand 308,579,585,604; 2 Farrand
297-98, 442, 548. For the Virginia convention, see 3 Elliot's Debates: 151-52,
315-16, 326, 333, 351-56 (Patrick Henry) ; 239-40 (Geo. Nicholas) ; 292-93,
340-42, 349-51, 505-06 (Grayson) ; 301-02 (Pendleton) ; 311-13, 333, 344-49,
514-15 (Madison) ; 333-34 (Lee); 334-40, 344 (Monroe) ; 356-61 (Wilson
Nicholas) ; 361-64, 602 (Randolph) ; 507-09 (Mason) ; 511-12 (Corbin) ;
609-10 (Dawson). For the North Carolina convention, 4 Elliot's Debates:
115-16 (Porter) ; 167-68 (Bloodworth).
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Congress with power to make treaties, and Hamilton's suggestion
that the power be exercised by a chief executive and senators
elected for life, there was nothing on treaty making before the Convention until the committee of detail reported on August 6. It proposed that "the Senate of the United States shall have power to
make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the
supreme Court," - this in the context of a bicameral legislature
containing a Senate to which each state legislature would elect two
members, and a House of Representatives chosen by the people of
the several states in proportion to population (at the rate of one to
forty thousand), in a manner prescribed by the state legislatures but
subject at any time to alteration by "the Legislature of the United
States." Each house was to have, "in all cases," a negative on the
other. The President, who was to "be elected by ballot by the Legislature," was not included in treaty making. 8
Some discussion occurred the next day, when Governeur Morris
proposed that the negative of each house upon the other be with
respect to "legislative acts" rather than "all cases." George Mason
contended that since treaties were elsewhere declared to be laws
(i.e., in the supremacy clause), the Morris amendment would include them, whereas it was intended they be left to the Senate; in
his view the negative should be confined to "cases requiring the
distinct assent" of the two houses. Rejecting both suggestions, the
Convention approved Madison's motion to delete the phrase authorizing the negative on the ground the power was sufficiently apparent
from the distinct character of the houses and the legislative procedures intended. 89
On August 15 Mason was arguing against permitting the Senate
to amend money bills, which were required to originate in the
House; "he was extremely earnest to take this power from the
Senate, who he said could already sell the whole Country by means
of Treaties." Debating a motion to postpone the point until the
powers of the Senate could be gone over John Mercer agreed the
Senate should not have the treaty power; it belonged to the executive department, but treaties should not become final so as to alter
the law of the land until ratified by legislative authority. He understood this to be the British practice.9° Mason explained that he did
not mean "a Treaty would repeal a law; but that the Senate by
means of treaty might alienate territory erc. without legislative
88. 2 Farrand 177-89, arts. III, IV, V, VI, IX, X.
89. 2 Farrand 196-97.
90. Discussion of both British and French practice was frequent. See 2
Farrand 392-95, note 77 mepra (for ratification conventions). 1 Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 197-99 (Sharswood ed. 1859), was
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sanction.... If Spain should possess herself of Georgia therefore
the Senate might by treaty dismember the Union.""' This argument
on the possibility of dismembering the Union by treaty became an
issue in the ratification conventions in Virginia and North Carolina,
where it was argued that under the rule requiring concurrence of
two-thirds of those present senators from five states (assuming a
2
bare quorum) could cede territory or rights of other states.0
On August 23 the Convention took up the proposal of the committee of detail. Madison observed that because the Senate represented states alone and for "other obvious reasons" the President
should be an agent in treaties. Governeur Morris doubted treaties
should be referred to the Senate at all but for the present moved to
add: "but no Treaty shall be binding on the U.S. which is not
ratified by a law." This seemed to Madison and Ghorum inconvenient for treaties of peace or alliance; Ghorum believed negotiations would have to be previously ratified, otherwise negotiators
going abroad would not be instructed by the same authority which
ratified. Unmoved by this, Morris said it would be well to oblige
foreign states to negotiate here, nor was he "solicitous to multiply &
facilitate Treaties"; we should wait for good bargaining opportunities. Wilson and Dickinson supported the amendment, but it was
defeated by eight states to one, with one divided.9 3 Madison then
"hinted for consideration, whether a distinction might not be made
between different sorts of Treaties - Allowing the President &
Senate to make Treaties eventual and of Alliance for limited terms
and requiring the concurrence of the whole Legislature in other
Treaties." 94 We hear nothing more of this.
The principal clause was referred to a committee of five, later
to a committee of eleven on postponed and remaining questions. On
September 4 the latter reported this clause: "The President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall have power to make
treaties. ... But no Treaty shall be made without the consent of
two thirds of the Members present. '9 5 We have little indication of
frequently invoked; he attributed to the King a complete power to make
treaties, but said a check against abuse existed in "parliamentary impeachment,
for the punishment of such ministers as from criminal motives advise or
conclude any treaty, which shall afterwards be judged to derogate from the
honour and interest of the nation." Hence American discussion often questioned vesting trial of impeachments in the Senate, since it would hardly
convict the President for impropriety in making a treaty to which it had
consented.
91. 2 Farrand 297-98.
92. See note 86 supra.
93. 2 Farrand 392-93.
94. 2 Farrand 394.
95. 2 Farrand 495.
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the committee's reason for the change,9 6 but it was reported with a
number of other final changes in the manner of electing the President, and his powers, which cleared the air.
Many efforts were made to amend, but all were defeated. They
included association of the House of Representatives with the
Senate in advice and consent; exemption of treaties of peace from
the two-thirds rule (at first accepted, then reconsidered and rejected) ; authorization of treaties of peace by two-thirds of the Senate without the President; complete elimination of the two-thirds
requirement; enlargement of the requirement to two-thirds of the
whole membership of the Senate; substitution of a majority of the
whole membership; requirement of two-thirds of the membership
to form a quorum; consideration of treaties only after previous
notice to members and a reasonable time for their attending?1
These proposals were decisively rejected, except for six to five
votes against two amendments which would have reduced the vote
required. Since the amendments reflect several points of view the
result may indicate a realistic compromise had been struck. Its
rationale lay in association of executive'capacity for fact finding,
negotiation, and swift, secret action with the safeguard of legislative
policy review; in the representation of national interest by the
President, of state interest by the Senate; in the protection of the
interests of a minority group of states against a bare majority by
the two-thirds rule.
These considerations can only be inferred from the proposals
made in the Convention of 1787, but they became explicit in the
s
explanations which delegates gave to the ratifying conventionsY
96. Pierce Butler, a member of the committee of eleven, gave the Legislature of South Carolina this explanation: "It was at first proposed to vest the
sole power of making peace or war in the Senate; but this was objected to
as inimical to the genius of a republic, by destroying the necessary balance
they were anxious to preserve. Some gentlemen were inclined to give this
power to the President; but it was objected to, as throwing into his hands
the influence of a monarch, having an opportunity of involving his country
in a war whenever he wished to promote her destruction. The House of
Representatives was then named; but an insurmountable objection was made
to this proposition-which was, that negotiations always required the
greatest secrecy, which could not be expected in a large body....
4 Elliot's
Debates 263. To similar effect, see Pinckney 4 id. at 264-65. Madison, also
a member of the committee, described it in terms of checks and balances, as
the safest arrangement. 3 id. at 515-16.
97. 2 Farrand 534, 538, 540-41, 543, 547-50.
98. See especially 2 Elliot's Debates 466, 505-07 (James Wilson);
3 id. at 331, 347, 514-16 (Madison); 4 id. at 277-82 (Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney). Other comments: 3 id. at 510-11 (Corbin); 4 id. at 119-24
(Davie) ; 128-29, 132-34 (Iredell). And see Hamilton's view in The Federalist No. LXXV, that the treaty power is a mixed executive-legislative function
which could not properly be assigned to President or Senate alone.
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That of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to the Legislature of South
Carolina will serve as an example:
Now let us consider whether the power of making treaties is
not as securely placed as it was before. It was formerly vested
in Congress, who were a body constituted by the legislatures of
the different states in equal proportions. At present, it is vested
in a President, who is chosen by the people of America, and in
a Senate, whose members are chosen by the state legislatures,
each legislature choosing two members. Surely there is a greater
security in vesting this power as the present Constitution has
vested it, than in any other body. Would the gentleman vest it
in the President alone? If he would, his assertion that the power
we have granted was as dangerous as the power vested by
Parliament in the proclamations of Henry VIII., might have
been, perhaps, warranted. Would he vest it in the House of
Representatives? Can secrecy be expected in sixty-five members? The idea is absurd. Besides, their sessions will probably
last only two or three months in the year; therefore, on that
account, they would be a very unfit body for negotiation whereas
the Senate, from the smallness of its numbers, from the equality
of powers which each state has in it, from the length of time for
which its members are elected, from the long sessions they may
have without any inconveniency to themselves or constituents,
joined with the president, who is the federal head of the United
States, form together a body in whom can be best and most
safely vested the diplomatic power of the Union. 99
Events have not in all respects answered the expectations of the
framers. They did not indicate in what sense they understood "advice and consent" of the Senate. However, President Washington
and the Senate agreed that either oral or written consultation with
respect to negotiations or formal assent to written instruments
would be appropriate, according to circumstances, and that for oral
consultation the President might go to the Senate chamber or convene the senators elsewhere as might be convenient. Washington
did go to the Senate to discuss negotiations with the Southern
Indians, expecting the Senate to act as an executive council. Instead
it entered upon a tedious examination and debate of documents and
even proposed to refer items to committee. The President was unable to conceal his annoyance; after the better part of two legislative
days he obtained answers to his questions but is reported to have
said "he would be damned if he ever went there again."10 0 This was
the end of oral consultation and consequently of effective solicitation
of advice before negotiating; advice and consent have since come to
99. 4 Elliot's Debates 280-81.
100. See Hayden, The Senate and Treatids 1789-1817 at 11-14, 18-26
(1920).
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be directed wholly to treaties already negotiated and signed. Any
changes afterwards recommended can be obtained only by reopening
negotiations, and issues between the President and the Senate with
respect to treaties may thus be accentuated. The original plan might
have reconciled these differences in advance.
A reason assigned for excluding the House of Representatives
from the treaty power was the impossibility of preserving secrecy
of debate in the more numerous house. What was true of the House
in 1789 is even more true of the Senate today, in terms not alone
of numbers but also of vastly augumented reporting and communications facilities. Neither body is now able to keep a secret.
Another reason for preferring the Senate was that it represented
state governments as equal units, thus balancing the President, who
was elected by the people as a whole to represent national interests.
Since the seventeenth amendment senators have been directly
elected from the states as districts, but still in equal numbers irrespective of the size, population, wealth, or other differentiating
characteristics of states. They no longer speak for state governments
and sometimes are out of sympathy with then. They may speak for
the people of their states as a whole but so, usually, do the representatives in matters of external relations. The senators tend to
have longer political experience, greater party influence. To state
any regular pattern differentiating their interests from those of
members of the House of Representatives is not easy, except that
a larger proportion of individualists may become entrenched in
the Senate. If units of population are to be represented in treaty
making the House of Representatives would do it more equitably.
If state governments are to be represented neither house can do it.
II. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION

The positions reached by the framers of the Constitution may be
summarized .as follows: (1) They placed the treaty powers, without in terms defining it, as an enumerated power in the national
government and prohibited treaty making by the states; (2) they
left the scope of the treaty power to be defined in practice in the
light of the general principles and distribution of powers in the
Constitution; (3) it seems unlikely that they conceived of inherent
governmental powers in external affairs, for they were at pains to
enumerate external powers fully and to authorize powers "necessary
and proper" to the exercise of the enumerated powers; undoubtedly
they would have differed as to the extent to which additional powers
might be implied or result from enumerated powers but left this
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question to the courts, which have also differed; (4) they forbade
states to make any "agreement or compact" (as distinguished from
a "treaty, confederation, or alliance"), without the consent of Congress, but failed to mention a power in the national government to
make agreements other than treaties; probably it can be inferred
from the exclusion of the states and from the ample powers to
conduct foreign relations granted to the President and the Congress; (5) they provided that treaties made "under authority of
the United States" should be part of the supreme law of the land;
although it is not clear that this phrasing imports a requirement
of consistency with the Constitution, such a requirement seems implicit in making both the supreme law of the land, provided the
Constitution is considered the fundamental law from which the
treaty power derives; (6) although they discussed requirements
known or assumed to prevail in other countries of legislative approval of certain types of treaties, they made no such distinction
and decisively rejected a proposal that treaties must be put into
effect by statutes; nor did they express themselves upon the effect
to be given to terms of a treaty which might call for legislative
action; (7) they gave the President the right to make treaties with
the advice and consent of the Senate, two-thirds of the senators
present concurring, intending by this separation of powers to reconcile national and state interests, to join executive and legislative
capacities, to avoid irresponsible conduct, and to permit secrecy
in consultation; but they left the procedural details to be developed
in practice.
Although most of these provisions were adopted by comfortable
majorities in the convention it is fair to add that the delegates reflected the strong nationalist position far more than did the state
legislatures or the general electorate. Indeed, they had exceeded
their authority by deciding to propose a new constitution rather
than amendments to the Articles of Confederation. It is true that
the legislatures expected a strengthening of the powers of the national government to deal with external relations, for iveakness in
this area had been a primary reason for calling the convention. But
they had not anticipated that the changes would form part of a
strongly centralized federal structure which would lend strength
to a nationalist construction of powers. Needless to say, there were
important elements of opinion in the country which were not
prepared to accept such a tendency. The creation of the new national
judiciary, in which federalist leadership continued for a quarter
of a century to be dominant, and which possessed the ultimate
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power to construe the treaty clauses, was therefore a change of
decisive importance.
Some reference has been made to judicial construction of the
general principles of the distribution of powers expressed in the
Constitution. It is in order now to examine cases more particularly
relevant to the treaty power.
A. TREATIES AND RESERVED POWERS
Treaties and statutes are both instruments rather than objects
of government. The legislative power is divided horizontally between the national stratum of government and the state stratum
according to the subjects to which it can be applied. In contrast
with this the treaty power is not defined in the Constitution in terms
of subjects and is not divided but vested exclusively in the national government. It thus includes a vertical cross section of the
subjects which are horizontally divided for legislative purposes.
It may not follow that it embraces all those subjects, but any limitation upon the subjects within the treaty power is not expressed in
terms of the division of powers between national and state governments. No prohibition has been stated against treaties which affect
subjects within the legislative power of the states, i.e., what have
been called reserved powers. Of course early states'-rights opinion
took the position that such a prohibition was intended, that it was
not supposed the national government could do by treaty what it
was not authorized to do by other means, 1" but the contrary view
has been rather consistently advanced by the federal courts.
The power to make treaties had not been defined in terms of
subject matter in the Articles of Confederation any more than in
02
the Constitution, and the case of Rutgers v. Waddington,1
in the
101. George Nicholas told the Virginia ratification convention, with

reference to the supremacy clause: "They can, by this, make no treaty which
shall be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, or inconsistent with the
delegated powers." 3 Elliot's Debates 507. Jefferson believed treaties must
concern foreign nations and matters "which are usually regulated by treaty,
and cannot be otherwise regulated"; also that "it must have been meant to
except out of these the rights reserved to the States; for surely the President
and Senate can not do by treaty what the whole government is interdicted
from doing in any way." He also excepted subjects of legislation in which the
House of Representatives participated, remarking that some felt this "would
leave very little matter for the treaty power to work on. The less the better,
say others." Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice 110 (1876) ; 5 Moore
162. (Emphasis added.)
102. Text of opinion in 1 Thayer, Constitutional Law 63-72 (1895).
Alexander Hamilton, appearing as counsel, argued that "though in relation
to its own citizens local laws might govern, yet in relation to foreigners those
of the United States must prevail. It must be conceded that the Legislature
of one State cannot repeal a law of the United States." Corwin, The Progress
of Constitutional Theory between the Declaration of Independence and the
Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 Am. H.st. Rev. 511, 531 (1925).
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Mayor's Court of New York City in 1784, had already presented
a conflict of state legislation with the treaty of peace. However, the
court had managed to avoid the direct issue, giving effect to the
treaty upon the ground that the statute did not clearly show an
intent to violate the treaty; therefore it thought proper to indulge
a presumption against such inconsistency, following Blackstone's
tenth rule of statutory construction. The result produced popular
demonstrations and sharp differences of professional and legislative opinion.
After the Constitution came into force the immediate issue requiring construction of the treaty power continued to be state
statutes inconsistent with the treaty of peace. The issue was presented to the Supreme Court in the leading case of Ware v. Hylton,'0 3
which involved a conflict between a Virginia statute purporting to
release Virginia debtors from debts to British subjects upon payment
of the debts into the state treasury, and the treaty commitment "that
creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the
recovery of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts
heretofore contracted.

' 10 4

The Court held that payment by a Vir-

The court rejected this view, declaring that if the Legislature chose deliberately to enact a statute in contravention of a treaty, "there is no power which
can control them. When the main object of such a law is clearly expressed,
and the intention manifest, the judges are not at liberty, although it appears
to them to be unreasonable, to reject it; for this were to set the judicial
above the legislative, which would be subversive of all government." 1 Thayer,
Constitutional Law 70 (1895). Also see Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation 230 (1893). Even so there was a meeting of protest in
New York because the court had given effect to the treaty; a memorial
was sent to the Assembly which adopted a resolution condemning the judgment. Jay, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who shared Hamilton's views,
prepared a resolution with reference to the case for submission to the Congress, in which he described "the thirteen independent sovereign States as
having, by express delegation of power, formed and vested in Congress a perfect though limited sovereignty for the general and national purposes specified
in the Confederation. In this sovereignty they cannot severally participate
(except by their delegates) or have concurrent jurisdiction.... When therefore a treaty is constitutionally made, ratified and published by Congress, it
immediately becomes binding on the whole nation, and superadded to the laws
of the land, without the intervention, consent or fiat of state legislatures." He
recommended that Congress formally deny the right of State legislatures to
enact laws construing or obstructing national treaties, call upon the legislatures to repeal in general terms all statutes contrary to the treaty of peace,
and express its view that State courts must decide cases arising under the
treaty according to its intent "anything in the said acts . . . to the contrary
notwithstanding." 4 Journals of the American Congress 730 (1823). The resolution was approved by the Congress unanimously, but its recommendations
were rejected in New York, Virginia, and Rhode Island. Haines, The Role
of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics 1789-1835 at
97-98 (1944).
103. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
104. Preliminary Articles of Peace, Nov. 30, 1782, art. IV, 8 Stat. 54,
T.S. No. 102. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, art. IV, 8 Stat. 80,
T.S. No. 104.
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ginia debtor to the State of Virginia of money owed to a British
subject could not be pleaded in bar of an action by the creditor
against the debtor. Several of the justices concluded that the statute
either was invalid because confiscatory or ineffective as a confiscation, but it does not follow that they failed to pass upon the effect
of the treaty on the statute. 09 On the contrary they noted that the
statute declared the debtor discharged upon payment to the state,
clearly an impediment to recovery, and all but Mr. Justice Iredell
believed that the treaty defeated this consequence. Certainly the
opinions contain clear assertions of the supremacy of treaty over
statute. Thus Mr. Justice Chase said:
A treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land, that is of all the
United States if any act of a State Legislature can stand in its
way. If the Constitution of a State (which is the fundamental
law of the State, and paramount to its Legislature) must give
way to a treaty, and fall before it; can it be questioned, whether
the less power, an act of the State Legislature, must not be
prostrate? It is the declared will of the people of the United
States that every treaty made, by the authority of the United
States, shall be superior to the Constitutionand laws of any indizidual State; and their will alone is to decide. 0
Mr. Justice Patterson, referring to the treaty, said:
All lawful impediments of whatever kind they might be [are]
removed.... The act itself is a lawful impediment, and therefore is repealed; the payment under the
act is also a lawful im07

pediment, and therefore is made void.1

In like vein Mr. justice Wilson:
Independent, therefore, of the Constitution of the United States
(which authoritatively inculcates the obligation of contracts) the
treaty is sufficient to remove every impediment founded on the
law of Virginia."
The ruling was not an isolated one. In other cases effect was
given to rights of British subjects under the treaty of peace in the
face of state statutes sequestering debts due them 0 9 or confiscating
105.

For the contrary opinion see Tucker, Limitations on the Treaty-

Making Power 173-201 (1915).
106. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 236.

107. Id. at 250.
108. Id. at 281.
109. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794) ; Hylton v. Brown,
12 Fed. Cas. 1123, No. 6981 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) ; Hamilton v. Eaton, 11 Fed. Cas.
336, No. 5980 (C.C.D.N.C. 1792) ; Jones v. Walker, 13 Fed. Cas. 1059, No. 7507
(C.C. Va.) (opinion not dated); Page v. Pendleton, 2 Wythe 211, 217 (Va.
Ch.1793).
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their interests in property, 11' or statutes of limitations outlawing
recovery."' 1 Other early cases gave effect to provisions of the Jay
Treaty of November 19, 1794112 and the convention with France of

September 30, 180011 which permitted aliens to succeed to or dispose of property in this country, despite state statutes of escheat
under which grants had been made to others.
The position thus early assumed by the Supreme Court has
never been abandoned, although there were a number of obiter
dicta during the incumbency of Chief Justice Taney which suggested a contrary tendency. These were generally to the effect that
matters within the police power of the states are not subject to
regulation by treaty." 4 There was of course some tendency in other
110. Carver v. Jackson, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 1, 100 (1830); Hughes v.
Edwards, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 489 (1824); Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat) 453 (1819) ; Higginson v. Mein, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 415, 419 (1808).
111. Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454 (1806); Dunlop v. Alexander, 8 Fed. Cas. 87, No. 4166 (C.C.D.C. 1808).
112. .Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181 (1825) ; Society for
the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town of New-Haven,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823); Fairfax v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 603, 627 (1816).
113. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S.
(2 Wheat.) 259 (1817).
114. In Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840), Taney
observed that the object of a treaty must be "consistent . . . with the distribution of powers between the general and state governments." In the License
Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 613 (1847), Mr. Justice Daniels declared, "A
treaty, no more than an ordinary statute, can arbitrarily cede away any one
right of a State or of any citizen of a State." The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 283, 466 (1849), contain several dicta of this sort, notably that
of Chief Justice Taney in his dissenting opinion, "For if the people of the
several States of this Union reserved to themselves the power of expelling
from their borders any person, or class of persons, whom it might deem
dangerous to its peace, or likely to produce a physical or moral evil among
its citizens, then any treaty or law of Congress invading this right, and
authorizing the introduction of any person or description of persons against
the consent of the State, would be an usurpation of power which this court
could neither recognize nor enforce. I had supposed this question not now
open to dispute." Mr. Justice Grier's affirmative opinion seems to take a view
of the matter not markedly different. In lower federal courts considering
Indian rights under treaties with the United States, dicta of this sort appeared,
but the constitutional question was avoided in the only case squarely presenting the issue to the Supreme Court. See People ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 366 (1858) ; Lowry v. Weavor, 15 Fed. Cas. 1057, No. 8584
(C.C.D. Ind. 1846). In Prevost v. Greneaux, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 1 (1856),
there is a dictum that a treaty cannot divest rights already vested in a State.
But this case involved a state tax on aliens taking property in Louisiana by
inheritance, and the Court did not conclude that the treaty was intended to
apply to a tax already vested and complete before it was concluded. In
Frederickson v. Louisiana, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 445 (1860), the Court declined to consider whether a treaty could regulate dispositions or laws of
inheritance of foreigners with reference to property within the States, but
said the question was one of great importance, implying that such a right
on the part of the national government was very doubtful.
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courts to give effect to the views expressed in these dicta,"' until
the Supreme Court reasserted its earlier positions. Since that period
it has done so consistently, giving effect to many treaties which
have invaded significant fields of reserved pcwer.
An important group of cases deals with the position of resident
aliens. The courts have sustained treaties removing disabilities of
aliens under state statutes to succeed to and dispose of land.- 6 They
have given effect to treaties designed to prevent state discriminations
against resident aliens in the conduct of trade or business; or in
such travel, tenancy of shops, leasing of land, and other matters, as
may be incidental thereto." 7 Other treaties have operated to prevent
discriminatory treatment of aliens in taxation""' or in awards under

workmen's compensation laws." 69 Rights given by treaty to foreign
consular officers in the United States to be notified of the deaths of
their nationals resident here, to take temporary possession of the
estates of such persons or intervene in the administration of them,
or to take property of intestate aliens having no heirs or next of

kin,'2 20 have been upheld despite inconsistent procedures required by
115. Compare Siemssen v. Bofer, 6 Cal. 250 (1856), with Forbes v.
Scannell, 13 Cal. 242 (1859); see Compagnie Franqaise de Navigation a
Vapeur v. State Board of Health, 51 La. Ann. 645, 25 So. 591 (1899), aff'd,
186 U.S. 380 (1902) (construing the treaty as not in conflict with the statute).
Magnani v. Harnett, 257 App. Div. 487, 10 N.Y.S.2d 107 (3d Dep't 1939);
cf. Leong Mow v. Board of Commr's, 185 Fed. 23 (C.C.E.D. La. 1911);
Lubetich v. Pollock, 6 F.2d 237 (W.D. Wash. 1925).
116. Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449 (1930) ; Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333 (1901); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890) ; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879) ; Bahaud v. Bize, 105 Fed. 485 (C.C.D.
Neb. 1901) ; People v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381 (1855) ; Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y.
-2, 128 N.E. 185 (1920) ; In re Stixrud, 58 Wash. 339, 109 Pac. 343 (1910) ;
for additional citations, see Annots., 4 A.L.R. 1377 (1919); 17 A.L.R. 635
(1922) ; 134 A.L.R. 882 (1941).
117. Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928) ; Asakura v. Seattle, 265
U.S. 332 (1924); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Ex parte
Heik-ich Terui, 187 Cal. 20, 200 Pac. 954 (1921). However, there were many
cases in which state restrictions upon aliens were held not to conflict with treaties
designed to afford them equal treatment in the pursuit of a livelihood: e.g.,
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) ; Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R., 213 U.S. 268 (1909) ; Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923) ; Heim
v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915). Cf. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
Treaties have been progressively strengthened to avoid such results; see 1
Hyde § 204.
118. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929); American Trust Co. v.
Smyth, 247 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Ex parte Heikich Terui, 187 Cal. 20,
200 Pac. 954 (1921); Trott v. State, 41 N.D. 614, 171 N.W. 827 (1919);
other citations in A.L.R. annotations supra note 116.
119. De Biasi v. Normandy Water Co., 228 Fed. 234 (D.N.J. 1915);
Vietti v. George K. Mackie Fuel Co., 109 Kan. 179, 197 Pac. 881 (1921) ;
lannone v. Radory Construction Corp., 285 App. Div. 751, 141 N.Y.S.2d 311
(3d Dep't 1955).
120. For references to the numerous conventions on these subjects which
have been concluded by the United States see, 1 Hyde §§ 478-81. Also see
Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931) (taking property of intestate
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state statutes on probate and administration. Provisions exempting
foreign consuls from compulsion to appear as witnesses have likewise been upheld. 2'
Other treaties affecting reserved power areas are usually designed to control on a reciprocal basis persons whose activities are
of mutual concern to two or more states or affect relations between
them. A treaty in this category to restrict the hunting of migratory
birds passing between the United States and Canada led to the
famous case of Missouri v. Holland. 22 Although the principle involved was not novel, the issue was posed sharply because an earlier
effort at regulation by national statute had failed when the statute
was held to be an invasion of reserved powers and therefore unconstitutional. 23 In holding that the migratory bird treaty and a statute
implementing its commitments 24 were valid, the Court thus strongly
reaffirmed the principle that the treaty power is not excluded from
areas within the reserved legislative powers of the states:
It is said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution, that there are limits, therefore, to the treaty-making power,
and that one such limit is that what an act of Congress could not
do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a
treaty cannot do.... We do not mean to imply that there are no
qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must be
aliens) ; Todak v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449 (1930) (right of consuls
to administer) ; Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317 (1913) (consul's right of
temporary possession). For state decisions on the right of consuls to administer see In re Wyman, 191 Mass. 276, 77 N.E. 379 (1906) ; In re Lobrasciano, 38 Misc. 415, 77 N.Y. Supp. 1040 (Surr. Ct. 1902) ; In re Fattosini, 33
Misc. 18, 67 N.Y. Supp. 1119 (Surr. Ct. 1900). But see Rocca v. Thompson,
supra, where by a strained interpretation the Court held the treaty did not
authorize administration by the consul.
121. In In re Dillon, 7 Fed. Cas. 710, No. 3914 (N.D. Cal. 1854) the
court held compulsory process ought not to be allowed to force attendance
of a consul as a witness for the defense in a criminal case, although it was
argued the treaty privilege conflicted with the accused's rights under the
sixth amendment to the Constitution. The court concluded the amendment

was intended only to give the accused rights equal to those of the government

in compelling attendance, hence no conflict between the treaty and the Constitution occurred. For the diplomatic controversy with France over the

incident see 5 Moore, 78-81; for Secretary of State Marcy's view, 5 id. at 167.
United States v. Trumbull, 48 Fed. 94 (S.D. Cal. 1891), upholding a similar

treaty, avoided the sixth amendment on the ground the consul was called as
witness for the prosecution. In Samad v. The Etivebank, 134 F. Supp. 530
(E.D. Va. 1955) the court refused libellant's motion to hold a British consul

and vice consul in contempt for refusing to answer questions as witness for

respondents on the ground they were exempted by treaty as to matters within
the scope of official duties and their discretion to judge this must be respected.

122. 252 U.S. 416 (1920) ; see also United States v. Rockefeller, 260
Fed. 346 (D. Mont 1919).
123. United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288 (D. Kan. 1915) ; United
States v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
124. Migratory Bird Treaty, Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628;
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 40 Stat 755 (1918), 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-11 (1952).
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ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that there may be
matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that
an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed
by an act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in
matters requiring national action, 'a power which must belong
to and somewhere reside in every civilized government' is not to
be found. .

.

. What was said in that case with regard to the

powers of the States applies with equal force to the powers of
the nation in cases where the States individually are incompetent
to act. .

.

. The treaty in question does not contravene any

prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only
question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation
from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in deciding what that
Amendment has reserved ....
Here a national interest of very
nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by
national action in concert with that of another power.... We
see nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to
sit by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our
forest and our crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to rely
upon the States. The reliance is vain, and were it otherwise, the
question is whether the United States is forbidden to act.
We are
of opinion that the treaty and statute must be upheld. 1 25
In this reasoning there appear to be two elements: (1) the treaty
violated no prohibition in the Constitution and none is to be inferred
from the division of powers for legislative purposes; (2) control
was possible only through national action in concert with another
power. The first point is sufficiently explicit on the reserved power
question. As to the second, if the subject is here considered one of
national interest appropriate for diplomatic action, are we to infer
that questions of local interest which neither invite nor require
diplomatic action are beyond the treaty power? To this we shall
return shortly.
Related to the migratory bird question are the regulations by
treaty of fishing within the territorial waters of coastal states; such
conventions are now common, and the same answer has been
given.

2 0
2

Analogous to the treaties waiving state statutes of limitations
are those which authorize the extradition to other countries of
fugitives from justice, although within the jurisdiction of states,' 27
and those which limit the usual liability under local law for
125. 252 U.S. at 432-35.
126. See Commonvealth v. Trott, 331 Mass. 491, 120 N.E.2d 289 (1954);
22 Ops. Att'y Gen. 214 (1898).
127. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902) ; United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407 (1886) ; Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840) ; Ex

parte Charlton, 185 Fed. 880 (C.C.D.N.J. 1911).
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negligent injury ;128 both have been sustained despite their invasions
of jurisdiction normally local.
In all these cases the courts have felt that the treaties in question fell within any bounds which may limit the treaty power. They
declare that the limits of the delegated powers are not the limits
of the treaty power, but they do not, unless as dbiter dicta, provide
criteria for determining what the limits of the treaty power are.

B.

TREATIES AS DOMESTIC LAW

Cases giving effect to treaties as against state statutes of course
hold that the former are the supreme law of the land before which
contrary local regulations can not stand. However, in Poster v.
Neilsen,"2' 9 the Supreme Court developed an important distinction
between what are now called self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties, which determines the procedures whereby treaties become
the law of the land. From what has been said of the Convention of
1787 it seems unlikely that the framers intended legislative action
30
should ever be required to give effect to treaties in domestic law.'
Nevertheless Chief Justice Marshall concluded that when the terms
of the treaty stipulations in themselves "import a contract, when
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule
for the Court."''3
In a number of decisions stemming from Marshall's distinction
courts have indicated as criteria that treaties may be considered selfexecuting so as to take effect without legislative implementation,
when their terms clearly convey such an intention and'provide in
sufficient detail standards for executive-administrative application.
Where, on the contrary, treaties impose obligations intended to be
discharged through legislative action or fail to provide guides for
executive action, they are taken to be non-self-executing. 32 The
128. E.g., the Warsaw Convention, to which the United States adhered,
International Air Transportation, Oct. 12, 1929, T.S. No. 876, which limits
liability of international air carriers. See Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, 152 F.
Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957) ; Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 144 F. Supp.
359 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111
F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
129. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
130. See notes 92, 93 supra.
131. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314-15.
132. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) ; Cameron
Septic Tank Co. v. Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39 (1913); Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 418
(1886); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884); Chew Heong v.
United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884) ; United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of
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courts have been cautious in holding treaties to be self-executing,
especially as to those affecting fields of normal legislative regulation. 133
Among recent cases have been several on the question whether
human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter are selfexecuting so as to invalidate state laws or actions inconsistent with
them. In form these provisions are general statements of policy
coupled with commitments to "take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes" stated. 134 However, there had been earlier indications that
local policy must yield to an authoritative expression of foreign
policy. 13' Ought this view to be extended to give effect to a commitment to act to promote and encourage "respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" ?136 Answers both
affirmative and negative had been given by Canadian courts, 1 7 and
concurring opinions in cases in this country had assigned obligations
under the Charter as at least additional grounds for decision.'",
Finally the issue was squarely presented by Sei Fujii v. California."30 In this case the district court of appeal had struck down a
provision of the California Alien Land Law under which land
1 40
transferred to an alien not eligible for citizenship would escheat,
on the ground that the statute must yield to the Charter provisions
as the supreme law of the land. The California Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment, but did so solely because it believed the
effect of the statute was to discriminate arbitrarily against the
Japanese in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. It rejected the reasoning of the district court, and in
describing the Charter as "a moral commitment of foremost importance,""' held the human rights clauses to be non-self-executing
Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 196 (1876); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211,
247 (1872); Robertson v. General Electric Co., 32 F.2d 495 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 280 U.S. 571 (1929) ; Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co.,
133 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
133. Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cases 784, No. 13799 (C.C.D. Mass.
1855) ; Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., supra note 132.
134. U.N. Charter, arts. 1, 2, 13, 55, 56; quotation from art 56.
135. United States v. Pink-, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
136. U.N. Charter, art. 55.
137. See Re Noble, [1948] O.R. 579, 4 D.L.R. 123 (H.C.) (negative);
Re Wrenn, [1945] O.RL 778,4 D.L.R. 674 (H.C.) (affirmative).
138. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) ; Perez v. Lippold,

32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
139. 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
140. Sei Fujii v. California, 217 P.2d 481, rehearing denied, 218 P.2d
595 (1950).
141. 38 Cal2d at 724; 242 P.2d at 622.
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and not intended to supersede existing domestic legislation. This
result certainly seems consistent with the criteria developed in
earlier cases, for the human rights clauses contemplate a future
development of detailed standards and enforcement procedures. 42
The Supreme Court has not directly passed upon this point, but
it seems probable it would take the same position. In Shelley v.
Kraemer48 it held restrictive covenants unenforceable solely upon
constitutional grounds, ignoring a brief submitted for the United
Nations Association in which the applicability of the Charter provisions was urged on the ground they either stated a controlling
public policy or were supreme law of the land as a self-executing
treaty. In Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery,'44 the
plaintiff complained of a cemetery association's refusal to bury her
husband because of a restrictive covenant in the contract for sale
of the cemetery lot, claiming violation of both the fourteenth amendment and the human rights clauses of the Charter. The second
ground was dismissed as irrelevant by the Iowa courts, which held
that the restrictive covenant could be pleaded as a defense because
this would not amount to its enforcement by the state. The Supreme
Court initially affirmed the decision per curiam, as the bench was
evenly divided; but on rehearing the per curiam decision was
vacated and the initial grant of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted on the ground that an Iowa statute had made
such covenants illegal and the case was therefore not one of general
interest. 45 In the majority opinion Justice Frankfurter said, with
reference to arguments of counsel on the United Nations question:
The Iowa courts dismissed summarily the claim that some of the
general and hortatory language of this Treaty [the Charter],
which so far as the United States is concerned is itself an exercise of the treaty-making power under the Constitution, constituted a limitation on the rights of the States and of persons
otherwise reserved to them under the Constitution. It is a redundancy to add that there is, of course, no basis for any infer142. See Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614,25 N.W.2d 638 (1947) ; Kemp v.
Rubin, 188 Misc. 310, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct 1947) (the Charter clauses
were held not to apply to a restrictive covenant because of the domestic jurisdiction reservation in art 2, cl. 7) ; Hudson, Charter Provisions on Human
Rights in American Law, 44 Am. J. Int'l L. 543 (1950). Cf. Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892) (a restrictive covenant against renting
to Chinese was held void as an infraction of a treaty which contained a mostfavored nation clause).
143. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
144. 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953). The contract reserved burial
privileges to members of the "Caucasian race"; the deceased, a Korean war
veteran, was partly Winnebago Indian. President Eisenhower authorized
burial in Arlington National Cemetery.
145. Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954),
per curiam decision vacated, certioraridismissed, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
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ence that the division of14 6this Court reflected any diversity of
opinion on this question.
This seems to mean that the Court agreed with the Iowa courts
that the human rights clauses were inapplicable, presumably because non-self-executing but perhaps because merely "general and
hortatory." The writer cannot undertake to judge whether a distinction is intended between exhortation to reform and a non-selfexecuting legal commitment to reform. The words of article 56 do
seem to be a commitment to action by the signatories.
Assuming that a treaty has become the supreme law of the land
either through the force of its own language or by legislative implementation, what is its relation to those other constituents of the
supreme law, the Constitution and the federal statutes pursuant
thereto? With respect to the latter the courts have consistently
held that treaties and statutes are mentioned in terms of equal
dignity in the supremacy clause, and therefore in the event of a
conflict between them whichever is later in time must prevail.2'4
Courts tend to hold that conflicts are not intended when by a reasonable construction of the instruments they can be avoided. 14 8 Even so,
cases of clear inconsistency have occurred frequently.
It results that Congress does keep in its hands important controls over treaties. As soon as treaties have been ratified and the
ratifications exchanged or deposited the treaties impose international
obligations upon the United States, the violation or non-observance
of which will expose it to legal liability to other signatories. Yet if
the treaty be non-self-executing (which the Senate could insist
upon as a condition of consent to ratification), it is possible for the
Congress to balk its domestic effect by refusing to implement it by
146. 349 U.S. at 73.
147. Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951) ; Clark v. Allen, 331
U.S. 503 (1947); Pigeon River Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138

(1934); Sanchez v. United States, 216 U.S. 167 (1910); Hijo v. United
States, 194 U.S. 315 (1904) ; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893) ; Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) ; Head Money Cases,
112 U.S. 580 (1884) ; The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871) ;
Ballester v. United States, 220 F.2d 399 (Ist Cir. 1955) ; Arizona v. Hobby,
221 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Rumsa, 212 F.2d 927 (7th
Cir. 1954) ; Colonial Molasses Co. v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 242 (Cust.
Ct. 1957) ; United States v. Gredzens, 125 F. Supp. 867 (D. Minn. 1954).
148. See, e.g., Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907); Lem Moon
Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895) ; United States v. Forty-Three
Gallons of Whiskey, 108 U.S. 491 (1883); American Trust Co. v. Smyth,
247 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1957) ; In re Lobrasciano, 38 Misc. 415, 77 N.Y. Supp.
1040 (Surr. Ct. 1902).
149. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). See the views of Murray, Lyman, Gallatin, Madison, in the debate on Jay's Treaty in the House
of Representatives, 1796: 4 Elliot's Debates 435-38. A few writers have
argued Congress has a duty to implement treaties. See 1 Kent, Commentaries
on American Law 286-87 n. 1 (14th ed. 1896).
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legislation. 149 And if the treaty be already in effect as external obligation and internal law, a statute may still frustrate its domestic
operation or force international abrogation. 110 This result is a
logical consequence of our separation of the governmental powers to
assume obligations and to discharge them. It was clearly put by
Chief Justice Taft:
[T]he treaty-making power is the promising power of the government; and when we make a promise ... the treaty-making
power is the government. Congress is the performing power of
the government.... [I]f Congress does not perform the promises
made by the government . . . then it breaks its promise, that
is all.151
Conversely, a treaty will prevail over a prior inconsistent statute,
but the possibility in practice of overriding federal statutes in this
way is negligible because opportunities for treaty making are limited
by the wishes of other independent states and to subjects of mutual
interest. Statutes are not so limited and could be directed toward
deliberate frustration of particular treaties. Since the treaty power
extends to some objects which are beyond the legislative power of
the Congress it has been thought an inconsistency that it should be
subject to negation by the Congress. 15 2 The difficulty is more
theoretical than practical. Granted that international responsibility
would be best assured if the promising and performing capacities
were vested in the same organ of government, 53, it is nevertheless
inevitable that in mixed governments some disjointedness will
occur. As usual the proof of the pudding is in the eating, however
self-defeating the recipe may seem. International commitments
undertaken by the President with the assent of the Senate, twothirds present concurring, have seldom been deliberately dishonored
150. I.e., "force" in the sense of making it practically necessary for the
President to act. See the Act of July 7, 1798, 1 Stat. 578, denouncing the
treaty with France, and the comment of Davis, J., in Hooper v. United
States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 418 (1887) : "The treaties therefore ceased to be a
part of the supreme law of the land, and when Chief-Justice Marshall stated,
in July, 1799 . . . that there was no treaty in existence between the twro nations, he meant only that within the jurisdiction of the Constitution the treaties
had ceased to exist, and did not mean to decide, what it was exclusively within
the power of the political branch of the Government to decide, that, as a
contract between two nations, the treaties had ceased to exist by the act
of one party, a result which the French ministers afterwards said could be
reached only by a successful war."
151. Taft, Address: The League of Nations, 40 Can. L.T. 1025, 1037
(1920).
152. Boyd, The Expanding Treaty Power, 6 N.C.L. Rev. 428, 430
(1928); Stinson, The Supreme Court and Treaties, 73 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1
(1924).
153. Assuming, of course, an organ with a sense of international responsibility. Merum imperium of a Nazi or Soviet type would scarcely qualify.
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by legislative action of the President and a majority of both Houses
Statutory frustration of treaties results more often from inadvertence, unforeseen circumstances, and incidental conflicts between
instruments intended for quite different purposes.
It is open to the Senate to stipulate conditions which alter the
terms or effect of a treaty, but these must be accepted by the othei
signatories before the treaty can enter into force. If the Senate's
consent to ratification is accompanied by stipulations which do not
affect the terms or effect of the treaty but relate only to domestic
arrangements under it, these will not by association with the treaty
acquire status as the law of the land or affect existing statutes.154
C.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE TREATY POWER

In considering the relationship between treaties and the Constitution we may begin with Justice Holmes' remark that if it is
open to question whether treaties must be consistent with the Constitution to qualify as having been made "under authority of the
United States," it does not follow that they can be inconsistent with
the Constitution and still qualify as supreme law of the land.51 5 As
already suggested we are spared this result if we accept Chief
Justice Marshall's premise that the Constitution is the fundamental
law which governs the disposition of all powers. 5 6 If the treaty
power is conceived as a constitutional power it cannot rise above
its source, and treaties repugnant to the Constitution must be void.
Even those who accept the Sutherland view that external powers
are inherent and do not derive from the Constitution have not denied
that constitutional limitations must be observed. Since provision is
made for the treaty power in the Constitution they have argued not
that this power is to be emancipated from constitutional restraints
but that organs of the national government possess additional instruments and methods of external action not specified in the Constitution. The danger of irresponsible action implicit in such a position
is apparent, whether it involves the treaty power or not; it is
therefore gratifying to note that the Supreme Court has first quali57
fied and more recently sharply attacked the position
154. Power Authority of the State of New York v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957).

155. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) : "Acts of Congress
are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of
the United States. It is open to question whether the authority of the United
States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention.
We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making
power; but they must be ascertained in a different way."
156. See note 81 mtpra.
157. See text discussion of Reid v. Covert, at note 44 supra.
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At no time has the Court given any support to assumptions that
treaties inconsistent with the Constitution can be valid or take
effect as law of the land. A characteristic expression was that of
Justice Field in Geofroy v. Riggs:
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms
unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that
instrument against the action of the government or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government
itself and from that of the States. It would not be contended that
it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids,
or a change in the character of the government or in that of one
of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the
latter, without its consent.... But with these exceptions it is not
perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be
adjusted touching any matter which is properly the subject of
negotiation with a foreign country.'15
Similar statements can be found in many cases."' It is sometimes said that their force is weakened by the fact the Court has
158. 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
159. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) ; United States v. Minnesota,

270 U.S. 181, 207-08 (1926) ; Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) ;
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ; Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17

Wall.) 211, 242-43 (1872) ; The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616
(1871) ; Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853); Holmes v.
Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840) ; United States v. Rockefeller,
260 Fed. 346 (D. Mont. 1919) ; People v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381, 384 (1855). See

also Hamilton's comment in Camillus, 5 Works of Alexander Hamilton 301
(Lodge ed. 1885) :

The only constitution exception to the power of making treaties is, that

it shall not change the Constitution; which results from this fundamental

maxim, that a delegated authority cannot alter the constituting act, unless
so expressly authorized by the constituting power. An agent cannot newmodel his own commission. A treaty, for example, cannot transfer the
legislative power to the executive department.

There have been occasional executive statements to the same effect. In 1854
Secretary of State Marcy informed the Government of Venezuela that the

President could not submit a treaty which had been signed to the Senate
without advising against acceptance of a clause he thought contrary to the
Constitution. Mr. Marcy wrote, 5 Moore 169:
In reply, the undersigned hastens to inform Mr. Aspurua that it is believed not to be competent to the treaty-making power of the United
States to enter into such an engagement as that contained in the twentyfifth article of the convention concluded at Caracas on the 20th day of
September by the plenipotentiaries of Venezuela and the United States, viz:
'Whenever one of the contracting parties shall be engaged in war with
another state, no citizen of the other contracting party shall accept a
commission or letter of marque for the purpose of assisting or cooperating hostilely with the said enemy against the said party so at war,
under the pain of being considered as a pirate.'
The Constitution of the United States provides that Congress shall
'define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas.' Although several conventions have been made by this government with
foreign governments, some of which continue in force, containing, in
substance, the stipulation just quoted, they were evidently contracted by
an oversight of one of the provisions of the Constitution-the supreme
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never held any treaty unconstitutional; hence any criteria of constitutionality it has stated are only dicta. But its observations have
been made with consistency and in cases in which the constitutionality of treaties was in issue. If it has not found any treaty unconstitutional this results from the care with which the drafters have
observed constitutional limitations, from the admittedly broad scope
of the treaty power, and from the Court's tendency to avoid unconstitutional applications by construing treaties as not having intended
them.""0 It also seems possible that there have been a few unconstitutional treaties which have not been tested in the courts, although
professional opinion is divided as to this.""'
law of this country. The President, entertaining this opinion, can not
consent to transmit the convention negotiated by Mr. Eames, which in

all other respects meets with his approval, to the Senate for ratification

without presenting to that body his objections to the article aforementioned.
S Moore, Dig. of Int'l Law 169.

160. See Iii
re Dillon, 7 Fed. Cas. 710, No. 3914 (N.D. Cal. 1854) ; the

court sustained the broad consular privilege granted by the treaty by a construction of the sixth amendment of the Constitution which certainly leaves
some doubt. More often it is the treaty which is construed into consistency
with the Constitution. For a good example see New Orleans v. The United
States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836), where limited rights of the Spanish
crown to exercise a police power over a quay and public areas along the
Mississippi River bank, although they were not crown lands, were held
not to pass by the treaty of cession to the United States Government, despite
rather clear words conveying the whole of the crown's rights, because the
national government cannot under the Constitution exercise such rights
except in the national domain. See comment in Feidler and Dwan, The Extent
of the Treaty-Making Power, 28 Geo. L.J. 184, 19)-91 (1939).
161. Although the Supreme Court had held in Cunard Steamship Co. v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923), that the eighteenth amendment and the
Volstead Act were violated by carrying liquor as ship's stores for use of crew
and passengers into United States' territorial waters, the United States entered
into treaties with a dozen or more foreign states in which it agreed that the
penalty or forfeiture under the laws of the United States shall not apply to
such transport of liquor if kept under seal while within territorial waters. In
Milliken v. Stone, 7 F.2d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), aff'd, 16 F2d 981 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 274 U.S. 748 (1927), the courts declined to pass upon the constitutionality of the treaty with Great Britain on the ground plaintiffs failed
to show a sufficient interest to justify relief in equity. However, Secretary
of State Hughes expressed confidence in the constitutionality of the treaty
because the eighteenth amendment did not make provision for penalties and
forfeitures. As Congress in implementing the amendment had exempted
transit of liquors through the Panama Canal from penalties, acting in aid of
"what may be called the morale of that enforcement," because to apply them
would discredit the amendment and injure the interests of the United States
"without the slightest compensation in the way of carrying out the actual
purpose of the amendment," so the treaty power could make a like exception
as to ship's stores in territorial waters. Statement by Secretary Hughes,
Dec. 8, 1923, quoted in 5 Hackworth, Digest of international Law, 13-14
(1943). This conception of aiding enforcement of the amendment by exempting certain violations of it from penalty may seem casuistical to some, however realistic as to practical possibilities. "A sensible argument could be made
that the prohibition amendment resembled more closely the commercial and
real-property legislation which the Supremacy Clause was intended to affect
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What, then, are the criteria which the court has applied to the
determination of constitutionality. They appear to fall into three
groups: (1) violation of an express prohibition of the Constitution;
(2) violation of an implied prohibition of the Constitution; (3) use
of treaties to regulate purely local matters not affecting international
relations.
(1). Express Prohibitions
Most of the express prohibitions of the Constitution can be dismissed as having little relevance to treaties. Those directed against
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, bills of attainer, ex post
facto laws, capitation or direct taxes when not in proportion to
population, taxes or duties on exports, regulations discriminating
against the ports of one state as against those of another or levying
duties on intra-state coastal traffic, withdrawal of money from the
Treasury without appropriation by law and regular statement and
accounting, and granting titles of nobility, appear to be directed
primarily against obnoxious legislation. Assuming general application, it appears improbable that treaties would be made for such
objects, and cases have not yet been presented.
However, it may be suggestive of certain possibilities that the
United States entered into the London Agreement of 1945, with an
annexed Charter for the International Military Tribunal which sat
at Nuremberg, authorizing application to conduct of Axis war criminals of novel definitions of "crimes against peace" and "crimes
against humanity.' 1

62

The ex post facto character of such applica-

tions cannot be doubted, and the Tribunal itself was at pains to
show that it was under no obligation to apply the principle nultm
crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege.163 Of course the agreement
presented no constitutional issue because the German war criminals
were outside the protection of the constitutional prohibition.,6 4
With respect to appropriation of money by law it seems probable
that "law" would here be construed to mean "statute," although it
has been argued that the term would include a treaty as law of the
land.165 However, it seems a reasonable surmise that a treaty purthan it resembled provisions of the Bill of Rights, and that the treaty of 1924
was valid while a treaty purporting to establish, say, press censorship would
not be." Sutherland, Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1305,
1319 (1952).
162. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art.
6, 59 Stat 1544, 1546, E.A.S. No. 472. See also 1 Trial of Major War Criminals 10 (1947).
163. The Nurnberg Trial-1946, 6 F.R.D. 69, 107-08 (1946); Judicial
Decisions, 41 Am. J. Int'l L. 172, 217 (1947).
164. Cf. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), where claims by a Japanese
war criminal to certain constitutional safeguards were denied.
165. Feidler and Dwan, supra note 16{, at 192.
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porting to appropriate money would be treated as non-self-executing. The prohibition refers to the method of appropriating; it
certainly does not bar international commitments to provide money
although they can be discharged only with the aid of the Congress. 66
Such commitments have been extremely numerous and their consti67
tutionality has never been doubted.
There is one group of express prohibitions which have particular significance-those designed to protect individuals against interferences with their personal liberties. Most of these are blanket
prohibitions against governmental acts infringing the rights specified. However, the language of the first amendment is confined to
prohibiting Congress from making a law impairing freedom of
religion, speech, press, assembly, or petition. It is possible to argue
that other types of governmental activity, e.g., treaties, are not
subject to the prohibition. Until recently the point has been of no
moment because these liberties have been considered to fall within
areas of purely domestic concern and therefore to be outside the
treaty power on that account. Today there are some points relating
to first amendment freedoms upon which the formulation of minimum international standards has been thought desirable. That the
Government of the United States would by treaty subscribe to any
such international standard in a manner intended to supplant a
higher constitutional standard is not to be expected. 168 And the
broad language of the Supreme Court in recent cases suggests that
it would not exclude the amendment from the prohibitions applicable to treaties.
These cases have dealt with the rights of United States nationals
in other countries. The only significant older case of this type was
In re Ross,1 9 in which it was held that in a murder trial before
166. When in 1844 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported
adversely on a reciprocity treaty with Prussia drafted by Mr. Wheaton,
Secretary of State Calhoun said it was clear the mere fact of a power having
been delegated to Congress did not exclude it from being the subject of
treaty stipulations "-of which the power of .appropriating money affords a
striking example. It is expressly and exclusively delegated to Congress, and
yet scarcely a treaty has been made of any importance which does not stipulate
for the payment of money. No objection has ever been made on this account.
The only question ever raised in reference to it is, whether Congress has
not unlimited discretion to grant or withhold the appropriation." 5 Moore 164.
167. For a digest of such treaties with references to judicial comment
see Crandal, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement (2d ed. 1916) (indexed
sub. nom. "Appropriations, treaties involving.").
168. The United States has expressed objections to the United Nations
Draft Convention on Freedom of Information and Right of Review. 25 Dep't
State Bull. 504 (1951). For consideration of the relationship of various international conventions to domestic jurisdiction and standards see section III infra.
169. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
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an American consular court in Japan, exercising an extraterritorial
jurisdiction permitted by treaty, the accused was not entitled to the
constitutional guaranties of indictment by grand jury or jury trial.
The accused was a British subject but had signed as a seaman on a
ship of United States registry and flag; in the view of the Supreme
Court he was therefore to be treated as a United States national
for purposes of trial. The denial of the procedural rights in question
was founded upon the conclusion that these constitutional guaranties
are not applicable in the peculiar circumstances of consular jurisdiction in another country. The court used language needlessly
broad in saying they "apply only to citizens and others within the
United States, or who are brought there for trial for alleged offenses
committed elsewhere, and not to residents or temporary sojourners
abroad." However, on its special facts the case may be no more extreme than the later Insular Cases,170 in which the Court held that
only "fundamental rights," not including jury trial, need be protected in the unincorporated territories.
In recent years the United States has entered into a number of
"status of forces" agreements defining jurisdiction over members
of its armed forces stationed in other countries. 171 These recognize
the territorial jurisdiction of these countries over offenses of United
States servicemen unless committed at a United States military post,
camp, or station, or in line of duty. Among hundreds of cases which
have passed without event there have occurred two which attracted
widespread interest. Pvt. Richard T. Keefe and another soldier had
entered Orleans, France, after completing a brief confinement in a
United States guardhouse in Germany. They spent some time in
drinking and gambling, then hired a taxicab driven by an elderly
French national. Outside the city they beat the cabman until he
was unconscious, left him lying on the road, and drove to Paris.
On these facts they were of course surrendered to French jurisdiction, tried, and convicted. The trial and sentence were in all respects
regular under French law, and the Army observer who attended
reported no irregularities. Thereafter Keefe's wife applied in his
behalf for habeas corpus, naming as defendants the Secretaries of
State, Defense, and Army; and for a mandatory order to the Secre170. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) ; Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
171. NATO Status of Forces Agreements, June 29, 1951,4 U.S. Treaties
& Other Int'l Agreements 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 (effective Aug. 23, 1953) ;
Administrative Agreement with Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, 3 U.S. Treaties &
Other Int'l Agreements 3341, T.I.A.S. No. 2492 (effective Apr. 28, 1952) ;
Protocol Agreement, Sept. 29, 1953, 4 U.S. Treaties &Other Int'l Agreements
1846, T.I.A.S. No. 2848 (effective Oct. 29, 1953).
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tary of State to secure Keefe's release through diplomatic negotiations. The absurdity of these requests is apparent, for habeas corpus
tests only the propriety of the jurisdiction to order detention or to
detain, not errors in the exercise of jurisdiction, and in any case
Keefe was not in the defendants' custody; furthermore the district
court certainly lacked jurisdiction to order the Secretary of State
to take affirmative diplomatic action. In affirning the district court's
dismissal of the petition the court of appeals made it clear that it
found no violation of Keefe's constitutional rights
in the jurisdic7 2
tional arrangements or the conduct of his trial.'
In Girardv. Wilsonl'= a United States soldier stationed in Japan

sought habeas corpus against the Secretary of Defense and others to
prevent their surrendering him to Japanese jurisdiction for trial.
While guarding military equipment on a firing range in Japan he had
placed an expended cartridge case in the grenade launcher on his
rifle and projected it, striking and killing a Japanese woman who
had come on the field to pick up discarded brass. As Girard was
then on duty at a military installation but was acting in a wholly
unauthorized manner there was a difference of opinion whether he
should be tried by court martial or surrendered to Japanese jurisdiction. American military authorities in Japan thought he fell within
military jurisdiction, but meeting strong insistence from the Japanese
Government that he be surrendered they referred the question to
the Department of Defense. The Department decided to surrender
him and so notified the Government of Japan. The United States
District Court, District of Columbia, held that surrender of the
petitioner to Japanese authorities would violate his constitutional
rights, but refused habeas corpus on the ground he remained properly within court martial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed
refusal of the writ but reversed the finding that surrender of Girard
would violate his constitutional rights. It observed that the Administrative Agreement under which jurisdiction was determined
authorized a waiver of jurisdictional rights in favor of the other
state by authorities of the state having the primary right,'7

4

and

172. United States ex rel Keefe v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.

1954, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952 (1955).
173. 152 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.); affd on other grounds, 354 U.S. 524
(1957).

174. "3(c). If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise

Jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as prac-

ticable. The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State
for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver
to be of particular importance." Protocol Agreement, Sept. 29, 1953, 4 U.S.
Treaties & Other Int'l Agreements 1846, T.I.A.S. No. 2848.
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concluded that discretion to waive United States jurisdiction had
been properly exercised by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary
of State, with confirmation by the President. On the constitutional
question the Court noted that Japan had exclusive jurisdiction to
punish offenses against its laws within its borders except as it had
consented to surrender it, citing The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.17 5 Japan's surrender of jurisdiction was conditioned by the
discretionary arrangement under which Girard was given up, and
the Court found "no constitutional or statutory barrier to the provision as applied here."
The Girardcase cannot be taken simply as a relinquishment of
normal military jurisdiction by executive fiat. Normal jurisdiction
over Americans in Japan lies with Japanese civil courts. No constitutional right to trial by an American tribunal can exist. Although
the Protocol Agreement under which Japan permitted United States
military jurisdiction in certain cases was an executive arrangement
it was authorized to be made by an Administrative Agreement in turn
authorized by the Security Treaty signed in 1951. The Administrative Agreement specified the pattern of the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement signed in 1951 and ratified in 1953; it also provided that
jurisdiction in any case might be waived by the United States. The
Administrative Agreement was considered by the Senate before it
gave consent to ratification of the Security Treaty, and it came into
force on the same day as the treaty. After ratification of the NATO
Agreement the Protocol Agreement with Japan on jurisdiction was
signed. Thus the principle of waiver of jurisdiction by executive
discretion was considered and approved by the Senate; it was merely
spelled out by executive agreement. The view of the district court
that it deprived Girard of constitutional rights to deny him the right
to be tried under the Uniform Code of Military Justice enacted by
Congress seems untenable, for the arrangements under the Security
Treaty were later in time than the statute. Perhaps the wisdom of
placing discretion to waive jurisdiction over armed forces abroad
in executive hands is questionable, but the power to do so by treaty
is clear.
175. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). However, in deciding that a
public armed vessel is exempted from territorial jurisdiction when it enters
the waters of another state, Chief Justice Marshall suggested obiter that if
troops are permitted to pass through a State's territory it consents without
express declaration to waive territorial jurisdiction. During Senate hearings
on the NATO Status of Forces Agreement the Attorney General submitted a
memorandum to demonstrate the incorrectness of Marshall's dictum. Hearings
before Comm. on Foreign Rels., U.S. Senate, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 7
and 8, 1953; supp. hearing June 24, 1953.

1958]
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That these cases were not intended to have any application to the
personal liberties of civilians is apparent from the ruling in Reid v.
Covert.1 6 There the Supreme Court held that dependents of servicemen who accompanied them abroad could not be subjected to trial
under court martial jurisdiction for capital offenses in time of peace.
Speaking for four members of the majority Justice Black dismissed
In re Ross as an historical anachronism resting on a fundamental
misconception of the applicability of the Constitution abroad; the
decisions in the InsidarCases he distinguished as appropriate temporarily in newly acquired territories of very different traditions and
institutions. At the time of Mrs. Covert's offense, which occurred
in England, United States military courts exercised exclusive jurisdiction of offenses there by American servicemen and their dependents under an executive agreement; it was later superseded by
a treaty, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. In the other case,
in Japan, the agreements mentioned in connection with the Girard
case governed jurisdiction. It was argued by the Government that
the Uniform Code of Military Justice was legislation necessary and
proper to carry out United States obligations under these agreements. To Justice Black,
The obvious and decisive answer to this, of course, is that no
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from
the restraints of the Constitution ....

There is nothing in...

[the supremacy clause] which intimates that treaties and laws
enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution ....
It would be manifestly contrary
to the objectives of those who created the Constitution, as well as
those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights-let alone alien
to our entire constitutional history and tradition-to construe
Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power
under an international agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions. In effect, such construction would permit
amendment of that document in a manner not sanctioned by
Article V. The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed
to apply to all branches of the National Government and they
cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and the
Senate combined.
There is nothing new or unique about what we say here. This
Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of
the Constitution over a treaty ....

We recognize that executive

agreements are involved here but it cannot be contended
that
1 77
such an agreement rises to greater stature than a treaty.
176. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
177. Id. at 16-17 & n.33.
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He refers also to the fact that treaties and statutes are on a
parity so that in case of inconsistency the one later in time must
prevail, and concludes that "it would be completely anomalous to say
that a treaty need not comply with the Constitution when such an
agreement can be overridden by a statute that must conform to that
instrument."'17 Finding that a court martial does not meet the requirements of article III, section 2 or of the fifth and sixth amendments, applicable generally, and that article I, section 8, clause 14,
authorizing congressional regulation of the armed forces, is not
broad enough to include civilian dependents in time of peace, he
concludes that international agreements cannot alter these dispositions.
The opinion is the strongest and most pointed statement yet
made by the Court of the principle that treaties and executive agreements are subject to the prohibitions of the Constitution. If it can
be taken at face value it should lay many doubts at rest. In fact
there is no indication that other members of the Court contested
Justice Black's propositions concerning the treaty power. Two
concurring opinions by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan take somewhat different views of the extent to which In re Ross must be considered outmoded. The two dissenting justices would retain the
principles of that case. Thus their differences center upon what the
constitutional guaranties are; they do not affect the principle that
whatever those guaranties are they cannot be altered by treaty.
(2). Implied Prohibitions
How far implied prohibitions against the exercise of the treaty
power are to be drawn from the Constitution is doubtful. Presumably an alteration in the structure of the governmental agencies
and offices prescribed by the Constitution, or in the constitutional
allocation of powers to them, could not be effected by treaty; there
are dictato this effect. 179 There is also a dictum that the Government
of the United States could not by treaty cede territory within the
limits of one of its constituent states without the consent of that
state.180 But the opinion relied upon the fact that Secretary of State
Webster obtained the consent of the States of Maine and Massachusetts before proceeding with the adjustment of the Northeastern
Boundary dispute in 1842, whereas Webster himself stated that he
adopted this course because it seemed to him politically expedient
178. Id. at 18.
179. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890) ; Holden v. Jay, 84 U.S.
(17 Wall.) 211, 242-43 (1872) ; United States v. Rockefeller, 260 Fed. 346,
347 (D. Mont. 1919) ; People v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381 (1855).
180. Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 540-41 (1885).
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and not because he supposed it a legal requirement.""- There has
been much difference of opinion upon the point,8 2 but it is difficult
to point to any basis for inferring the prohibition. In practice such a
cession could hardly be anticipated unless upon the assumption of
a military defeat. In that case it would seem the means of compliance
would have to be found. It is useless to belabor such a point.
(3). Domestic Questions

In general terms the Supreme Court has suggested a limitation
inherent in the nature of treaty-making as a function of government,
i.e., that it is a technique for international adjustment of problems
of concern to two or more states. "[T]he treaty power of the United
States extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between our
government and the governments of other nations ;,,183 it "is broad
enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign
relations. 118 1 In a frequently quoted statement Charles Evans
Hughes said:
What is the power to make a treaty? What is the object of the
power? The normal scope of the power can be found in the
appropriate object of the power. The power is to deal with
foreign nations with regard to matters of international concern. It is not a power intended to be exercised, it may be
assumed, with respect to matters that have no relation to international concerns.
Noting that there will inevitably be subjects of mixed local and
international interest he suggested an adaptation of the doctrine that
intrastate commerce which burdens or affects interstate commerce
181. In a letter to Governor Kent of Maine he said: ". . . although I
entertain not the slightest doubt of the just authority of the government to
settle this question by compromise, as well as in any other way, yet in the
present position of affairs, I suppose it will not be prudent to stir, in the
direction of compromise, without the consent of Maine." 5 Moore 174. It
should be noted, however, that article V of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty
provided that the United States should pay certain sums to Maine and Massachusetts "in equal moieties, on account of their assent to boundary limits described in this treaty."
182. Chancellor Kent and Chief Justice Marshall believed territory
might be ceded by treaty although within the boundaries of a state. 2 Butler,
The Treaty Making Power 391 (1902) ; 5 Moore 173. See also Mr. Justice
McLean in Lattimer v. Poteet, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 4 (1840). Jefferson, when
Secretary of State, expressed the view that only a disastrous war could supersede the obligation to maintain the territorial integrity of the states, Report
to the President [1792], 1 Foreign Rel. 252 (1832). This was also Mr. Justice
White's view in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (concurring
opinion). Materials on the question are collected by Butler and Moore (loc.
cit.)
and by Corwin, National Supremacy 129-34 (1913).
183. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890) ; quoted in Asakura v.
Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924). Similar language: Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920) ; In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891).
184. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931).
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is subject to regulation under the interstate commerce power. Thus
the treaty power might properly be applied to a matter of intermingled international and local concern if the "international regulation could not appropriately succeed without embracing the local
affairs as well." And he concludes:
•.But if we attempted to use the treaty-making power to
deal with matters which did not pertain to our external relations
but to control matters which normally and appropriately were
within the local jurisdiction of the States, then I again say there
might be ground for implying a limitation upon the treatymaking power that it is intended for the purpose of having
treaties made relating to foreign affairs and not to make laws for
the people of the United States in their internal concerns through
the exercise of the asserted treaty-making power.185
It is unlikely the point would be contested, but the criterion of
constitutionality suggested is a very general one. The Permanent
Court of International Justice once observed that "the question
whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of
a State is essentially a relative question; it depends upon the development of international relations."'1s8 What questions are today
so purely local that regulation of them by treaty would be thought
unconstitutional? Probably the domestic criminal law (apart from
extradition) would qualify.187 Regulation of marriage and divorce,
except as it presents a problem of conflict of laws, family relations
generally, requirements for the exercise of suffrage, regulation of
private property and of descent and distribution of estates, except
as aliens may be involved, are perhaps examples. But it is clear
that many subjects considered only a few years ago to be wholly
local have become matters of international concern for which at
least partial regulation by treaty seems appropriate. These changes
would press against any rigid categories of permissible subject
matter which could be proposed. Discretion must necessarily be
left with the courts.
D. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
Although a good deal can be learned about the legal position of
executive agreements by a study of practice with respect to them,' 8
185. Proceedings, 23 Am. Soc'y of Int'l L. 194-96 (1929).
186. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, P.C.I.J., Ser.

B, No. 4, at 24 (1923).

187. In The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925) it is said:
"It is not the function of treaties to enact the fiscal or criminal law of a

nation. For this purpose no treaty is self-executing.... Certain it is that no

part of the criminal law of this country has ever been enacted by treaty." As
to the Genocide Convention, not ratified by the United States, see Section

III infra.
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judicial materials on the subject remain meager. No doubt this is
due in part to the absence of specific constitutional provisions controlling practice. Agreements vary in kind: some are authorized by
the Congress, others are made under authority of a prior treaty,
some are made solely under executive authority.:1 9 That these
authorities or combinations of authorities can appropriately act with
respect to external relations within the range of delegated powers
cannot be doubted. To what extent this imports a power to make
international agreements other than treaties is less clear, or to turn
the point around, to what extent the total pattern of delegated
powers and prohibitions inhibits such agreements is not clear.
The lack of procedural prescriptions favors the position of the
President. It is he who must act for the United States in international negotiations; in the sense that the agreement must be brought
into force through his action it is always "executive." With Mr.
Justice Sutherland's remarks upon the peculiar capacities of the
President in external relations it is possible to agree thoroughly,
even though rejecting his view of inherent powers:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not
alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion
of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations- a power which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every
other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination
to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations,
serious embarrassment- is to be
embarrassment -perhaps
avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and
inquiry within the international field must often accord to the
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs
alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be
188. This is the primary approach in the full treatments by McDougal

and Lans, supra note 4; McClure, International Executive Agreements
(1941) ; 2 Hyde 1405-18. For certain aspects of recent practice see Section
III and the appendix by Gary J. Meyer infra.
189. See USAFFE Veterans Association, Inc. v. Philippines, printed in
50 Am. J. Int'l L. 686 (1956) (Ct of First Instance of Manila, 1956) for an
account of American practice incorporating the McDougal-Lans categories.
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highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive
of harmful results.1 90
Justice Sutherland concluded that a Joint Resolution of the
Congress of May 28, 1934, authorizing the President to impose an
embargo upon sale of munitions to certain belligerents was superfluous; he could have done this in his own executive capacity.
Whether or not this be true there are certain areas in which the
President possesses a primary power and responsibility, e.g., as
commander in chief of the armed forces, which would clearly support his individual action in concluding agreements appropriate to
the function.1 9'
In other agreements the President has appeared to act as an
agent to effect congressional purposes. Of course the terminology of
agency is in a formal sense inappropriate, not only because of the
President's independent position but also because the doctrine of
separation of powers opposes delegations of legislative power to
the executive branch. Nevertheless the cases upon this subject have
shown great tolerance of congressional authorizations to the President to enter into agreements modifying within specified limits the
statutory regulations of tariff and trade.192 The large number of
agreements under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934,
from time to time extended, is proof of the continued vitality of the
practice. A very broad authorization was given in the Postal Act
of 1872, that "the Postmaster-General, by and with the advice and
consent of the President, may negotiate and conclude postal treaties
190.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20

(-936).
191. Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 435 (1902) (military security); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (assignment of claims
against Americans by U.S.S.R. as part of agreement leading to recognition
of the U.S.S.R. by the United States) ; see United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937). The Rush Bagot Agreement of 1817, limiting naval armament on
the Great Lakes was negotiated as a presidential agreement. Later it was
submitted to and approved by the Senate but seems never to have been regarded as a treaty-no ratifications were exchanged. The Attorney General
in advising the President with respect to the exchange of over-age destroyers

for naval and air bases in 1940, emphasized, without relying exclusively upon,
his powers as commander in chief: "[I]t will hardly be open to controversy
that the vesting of such a function in the President also places upon him a

responsibility to use all constitutional authority which he may possess to
provide adequate bases and stations for the utilization of the naval and air
weapons of the United States at their highest efficiency in our defense." 39
Ops. Att'y Gen. 484, 486 (1939). See also the Security Agreement with Iceland, July 1, 1941, 55 Stat 1547, E.A.S. No. 232. The Potsdam, Yalta, and
Teheran Agreements of the Second World War fell largely within the President's war powers.
192. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928);
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) ; The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)

382 (1813).
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or conventions... between the United States and foreign countries."1 3 Since then postal conventions have regularly been concluded without submission to the Senate. The Supreme Court has
favored a greater latitude of congressional delegation in the field of
external relations than in domestic matters, perhaps viewing it, in
Sutherland's words, as "an authority which was cognate to the
conduct by him of the foreign relations of the Government."' 194
Treaties also provide authority for subordinate or supplementary
executive agreements. A long established type is the compromis
which defines the terms of submission to arbitration under a basic
convention. Recently, a complex of executive agreements has been
formed under the principles of the Chicago Air Convention of 1945.
The case of Girard has been noted, in which the Status of Forces
Agreement defining jurisdiction over United States forces in Japan
was authorized by an Administrative Agreement, which in turn was
virtually incorporated into the Security Treaty of 1951.
It does not appear that thevaried pattern of authorization affects
the international status of the agreements. They have all been considered as effective in engaging the international responsibility of
signatories as treaties could be. In B. Altman & Co. v. United
States, the court, in referring to a commercial agreement with
France, remarked:
While it may be true that this commercial agreement... was
not a treaty possessing the dignity of one requiring ratification
by the Senate of the United States, it was an international compact, negotiated between the representatives of two sovereign
nations and made in the name and on behalf of the contracting
countries, and dealing with important commercial relations between the two countries, and was proclaimed by the President.
If not technically a treaty requiring ratification, nevertheless it
was a compact authorized by the Congress of the United States,
negotiated and proclaimed under the authority of its President.
We think such a compact is a treaty under the Circuit Court of
Appeals Act, and, where its construction is directly involved, as
it is here, there is a right of review by direct appeal to this
court.'9 G
In internal law the executive agreement occupies an anomalous
position. It is not mentioned in the supremacy clause as part of the
supreme law of the land, and therefore may not occupy a position
equal in dignity to that of statutes and treaties. Perhaps it is neces193. 17 Stat. 304 (1872) (later amended by 48 Stat. 943 (1934), 5
U.S.C. § 372 (1952)).
194. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 422 (1935);
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
195. 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912).
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sary here to make some distinction among different types of agreements. The many agreements authorized by the Congress, under
which the President modifies statutory tariff schedules are clearly
instances in which the executive agreement sets aside the statute.
But the conjunction of Congress and President in doing this gives
the executive agreement the same political basis that a statute has.
To permit the one later in time to prevail is therefore logical. Postal
conventions have occasionally been described by courts as law of
the land ;"" however, in FourPackages of Cut Diamonds v. United
States,197 the court said such conventions "are not treaties, because
not made with the advice and consent of the Senate, and they are
not laws, because not enacted by Congress." However, the court
added: "If we assume that as administrative regulations made by
authority of Congress they have the force of law, the package was
imported contrary to law." There appears to be a disposition here
not to press legal distinctions to logical conclusions which would in
political terms seem unrealistic. In a formal sense it may be impossible to give advice and consent in advance to conventions within a
limited field, which have not yet been negotiated; in a practical
sense it offends no one's sense of separation of powers requirements
and may even be a reversion to that consultative function of the
Senate in treaty making which Washington supposed had been intended. An agreement under authority of a treaty presents less
difficulty; as it derives from one of the elements of the supreme law
it may properly follow the regular rule favoring the instrument
later in time in case of inconsistency with a statute.
In the case of purely presidential agreements there is a problem
of more substance. They are not supreme law of the land by reason
of any language in the supremacy clause, nor is it possible to say
that they satisfy the political requirements which would justify
assimilating them to any of the elements mentioned in that clause.
In United States v. Belmont, Mr. Justice Sutherland dealt with the
question whether foreign policy stated in a presidential agreement
(the Litvinov Assignment) would displace a contrary policy of the
State of New York:
196. Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 217 (1882) ; United States v.
Eighteen Packages of Dental Instruments, 222 Fed. 121, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
197. 256 Fed. 305 (2d Cir. 1919). In the earlier decision of the district
court, 247 Fed. 354, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), Manton, J., said, "Postal Conventions cannot be deemed treaties, because they are not adopted by the Senate,
and they cannot be deemed statutes, because Congress alone has power to
adopt statutes, and that power cannot be delegated. They cannot be considered treaties, because the treaty-making power is confined in the President
and the Senate by the Constitution. They are but provisions which determine
what merchandise may be received in the mail. .. "
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Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be
exercised without regard to state laws or policies. The supremacy of a treaty in this respect has been recognized from the
beginning.... And while this rule in respect of treaties is established by the express language of cl. 2, Art. VI, of the
Constitution, the same rule would result in the case of all
international compacts and agreements from the very fact that
complete power over international affairs is in the national
government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment
or interference on the part of the several states.... In respect
of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of
our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such
purposes the State of New York does nct exist. Within the field
of its powers, whatever the United States rightfully undertakes,
it necessarily has warrant to consummate. And when judicial
authority is invoked in aid of such consummation, state constitutions, state laws, and state policies are irrelevant to the inquiry
and decision. It is inconceivable that any of them can be interposed as an obstacle to the effective operation of a federal constitutional power. 1 8
And in United States v. Pink, Mr. justice Douglas, although he
qualified the Sutherland doctrine of inherent powers, asserted:
'All constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in
the judicial department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature;...' The Federalist, No. 64. A treaty is a 'Law of the Land' under the supremacy
clause (Art. VI, Cl. 2) of the Constitution. Such international
compacts and agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have a
similar dignity.""9
When taken within the peculiar facts of these cases to apply to
an executive agreement incidental to the President's admitted right
to recognize a foreign state the extremeness of this position is
mitigated but not altogether removed. The President's right to make
the agreement is certainly not in question, and the assertion that it
takes effect as if it were supreme law of the land need not be taken
to mean it is free from such constitutional limitations as would attach to the President's powers. Nevertheless, those powers in
external affairs are so broad and so little defined that it would seem,
in Corwin's words, "more accordant with American ideas of government by law to require, before a purely executive agreement be
applied in the field of private rights, that it be supplemented by a
sanctioning act of Congress.

'20 0

198. 301 U.S.324, 331-32 (1937).
199. 315 U.S.203, 230 (1942).
200. Corvin, The Constitution and What It Means Today 113-14 (11th
ed. 1954).
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The disposition of the Supreme Court to apply the constitutional
restrictions in favor of personal liberty to such presidential agreements is not in doubt. It suggested that the fifth amendment would
be applicable in appropriate cases to claims affected by the Litvinov
Assignment, 201 and in Reid v. Covert has reasserted th~se protections in the broadest terms.20 2
The position of the executive agreement in relation to federal
statutes has been examined by the federal courts in United States
v. Guy W. Capps, Inc. 20 3 Here the Capps Company sought to evade
penalties to which it was liable under an executive agreement concluded with Canada on November 23, 1948,204 for having violated a
contract by diverting to table use potatoes imported for seed purposes. It argued that the agreement was inconsistent with provisions of the Agricultural Act of July 3, 1948, and therefore void.
Chief Judge Parker, in the court of appeals, agreed, holding that
the executive agreement:
[W] as void because it was not authorized by Congress and contravened provisions of a statute dealing with the very matter
to which it related and that the contract relied on, which was
based on the executive agreement, was unenforceable in the
courts of the United States for like reason....
We think that whatever the power of the executive with
respect to making executive trade agreements regulating foreign
201.

See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,226-28 (1942) ; United States

v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937) ; Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States,
304 U.S. 126, 143 (1937).
202. See text at notes 174-76 smpra. In Seery v. United States, 130 Ct. C.
481, 127 F. Supp. 601 (1955), the Court of Claims held that the guarantee
of just compensation in the fifth amendment would apply to a claim by a
naturalized citizen against the United States based on damage to her house in
Austria, which had been taken over by the United States Army for an
officers' club. This result was reached although under an executive agreement with Austria all claims of persons owning property in Austria for losses
caused by United States forces were to be assumed by Austria. The Court
overruled contrary statements in Etlimar Societe Anonyme of Casablanca v.
United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 552, 106 F. Supp. 191 (1952). See also Turney v.
United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 202, 115 F. Supp. 457 (1953). The principle of the
Seery case seems more acceptable than the application; by the fact of her
naturalization the plaintiff exchanged a claim under the agreement which
would have resulted in payment in a then depreciated currency in the country
in which the investment was made, for a recovery in United States' dollars;
however it may be argued that the executive agreement had violated the fifth
amendment in removing her right of action under statutes permitting claims.
For comment on possible applications of the doctrine see Oliver, Executive
Agreements and Emanations from the Fifth Amendment, 49 Am. 3. Int'l L.
362 (1955).
203. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296
(1955). See Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment, Executive Agreements,
and Imported Potatoes, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1953).
204. Agreement with Canada on Exports, Nov. 23, 1948, 62 Stat. 3717,
T.I.A.S. No. 1896.
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commerce in the absence of action by Congress, it is clear that
the executive may not through entering into such an agreement
avoid complying with a regulation prescribed by Congress. 20 5
Unfortunately for the clarity of this position, there is some
reason to believe that the Congress had delegated to the President
authority to vary the terms of the Agricultural Act of 1948 by just
20 6
such an executive agreement as the one actually concluded.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in affirming the judgment declined to consider the relationship of the executive agreement to
the statute because it concluded the evidence did not show there had
been a violation of the contract with the Canadian exporter. Nevertheless Judge Parker's statement of principle seems a correct one,
whether relevant to the case or not.
It cannot be said that these cases have defined the constitutional
position of executive agreements with that nicety which may be
desirable, but their tendency is certainly toward subordinating them
to the elements of the supreme law of the land enumerated in the
supremacy clause.
(To be Continued)
205. 204 F2d at 658-60.
206. 62 Stat. 1250 (1948) : "No proclamation under this section shall be
enforced in contravention of any treaty or other international agreement to
which the United States is or hereafter becomes a party."

